3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

National Minorities in Ukraine

162 ●563 Minorities in Ukraine amount to 20 % in purely Ukrainian territory and to 24.7 % in other parts of the country and are the consequence of long domination by foreigners and the immigration that entailed. The same cause is responsible for increasing Jewish immigration; Jews have always appeared to assist the spread of Russian influence in the East and Polish in the West.

175 167 563 Contemporary minorities rarely date earlier than the second half of the 18th century, if we except a few peripheral areas in the west, the Tatars in Crimea and Russian colonisation in the east in the 17th century. Several earlier efforts made by the Polish Government and individual magnates to colonise the Right Bank region of Ukraine were unsuccessful; the first wave spent itself in the 16th century in the rebellion of Khmelnytskyj, while later colonists were completely absorbed by the native Ukrainian population. The Roman Catholic faith was able to persist only in a few places. A similar fate overtook Roumanian expansion in the 14th and 15th centuries in the Carpathians; it left traces in names and in the legal code of the settlements.

167 563 The Russians form the largest minority. Apart from the common colonisation of the Don area, it was only after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709) that Russians slowly penetrated into Ukraine. More numerous Russian settlers did not arrive till after there was no longer a Hetman (1764) and after the destruction of the Cossack Fortress (1775). At the same time the Turks were driven back from the Black Sea; the Ukrainian population, which had suffered great losses in the struggles with Turks and Tatars, was unable to tackle this job alone. But the Russians, who had been systematically settled, were disinclined to cultivate the steppe and preferred to move into the rising towns as officials, artisans and laborers.

Ten thousands of German colonists took their place, settled by Catherine II in the former Governments of Kherson, Taurien, and Katerynoslav, later also in Southern Bessarabia. At the same time Emperor Joseph II settled German colonists in

Southern Galicia and Bucovina. Immigrants who were of the 167
same faith as the Ukrainians also arrived at this time from 563
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Roumania (partly also from Armenia).

In the eighteen eighties the Russian Peasants' Bank settled 162
tens of thousands of Polish, German and Czech colonists 563
in Volynia. By far the majority of Poles in Galicia and in the 167
Kholm district also settled there as late as the second half of the 19th century, in Volynia and Polessia even in the 20th (in many cases after 1920). Single Polish settlements in the Right Bank region (especially in Podolia) are later in origin. Elsewhere the Polish population has been preserved in the towns only, the workshops and estates belonging to Polish landed proprietors. Even the "most Polish" area of Ukraine, the Markhlevitskyj district in Eastern Volynia, which was formed artificially for political reasons, only had 28 332 Poles, of whom, however, only 10 715 actually spoke Polish.

After the end of the 18th century Eastern Galicia was almost 162
purely Ukrainian; there were Poles only in the towns, in the 563
administration and in connection with big estates. This fact was emphatically recorded by Graf Pergen, an eminent Austrian official, after Galicia was transferred to Austria (1772). The official census reports for 1846 and 1851 still represented the Galician province of the Austrian empire as predominantly Ukrainian; 50.1 % (2 441 771) Ukrainians as compared with 40.9 % (1 994 802) Poles. The statistics for 1857 are: 45.2 % Ukrainians, 42.7 % Poles, 2.5 % Germans and 9.7 % Jews.

The Polish element has been artificially increased only since 1867, and then only slowly. In taking the census, the actual state of affairs was camouflaged by tricks of statistics; the Jews, for instance, were counted as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter in the census of 1910 by more than 800 000; another paper trick was played on Roman Catholic Ukrainians, who had mostly been converted in the course of recent years by cunning and force from the Greek Catholic United Faith to Roman (in Poland synonymous with Polish) Catholicism. Although they spoke no Polish and had otherwise the same interests as other Ukrainians, most of them were listed as Poles, thus increasing the number of the latter by almost half a million.

Every decade more and more united Catholics who were known to be of Ukrainian nationality were entered as Poles. In 1910 there were already 235 328 such "Greek Catholic Poles"; in 1921 there were 359 000 till the number of such Poles amounted to almost half a million. This explains what would otherwise be inexplicable: that the number of Ukrainians should have decreased from 4 880 312 in 1910 to 3873 223 in 1921, i. e. by 1 006 599, while in the same period the number of Poles is alleged to have risen from 15 319 734 (1910) to 18 820 163, i. e. by 3 500 429. As this was not sufficient to justify Poland's existence as a Great Power, the special group of „natives" was introduced, which was put down tentatively in 1921 as 41 000 and then, quite brazenly in 1931 as 707 000 (i. e. 2.2 % of the entire population of Poland, these being mostly Polesian Ukrainians). In addition to these tricks of statistics, a frank campaign of denationalisation was launched after the First World War by Poland with the support of the Roman Catholic Church. The following table shows how things developed:

Year	Greek Catholic	Roman Catholic
1869	64.2 %	21.84 %
1900	62.8 %	23.51 %
1910	61.7 %	25.31 %
1921	60.8 %	27.80 %
1931	60.1 %	28.50 %

This was the origin of the legend that Eastern Galicia was a country of mixed population to which Poland had a right, having contributed her share to the native population.

It is well known that Jews are aliens in Ukraine, and that they only appeared in Galicia in the wake of the Poles. Thanks to Polish support, the number of Jews in Ukraine has been almost doubled; it rose from 6.9 % to 12.8 % (1910).

In spite of political influences, the minorities have never succeeded in settling on areas of any extent. They are more strongly represented on the periphery and it is only in manufacturing towns that we find them in greater numbers living together. Of the 40 422 places in Soviet Ukraine, for instance 36 569, or 90.1 % were Ukrainian according to the statistics of 1925 and only 1769 or 4.5 % predominantly Russian, 1043 or 2.8 % predominantly German, 407 or 1.0 % predominantly Polish and about 200 predominantly Jewish (0.5 %) and 148 (0.4 %) predominantly Moldavian. 162 563

Circumstances are similar in the so-called „mixed" Eastern Galicia; according to official statistics before World War I there were 3298 village communities, i. e. 88.7 % with a Ukrainian majority and scarcely 436 places (11.6 %) with a majority of Poles or other nationals.

The Russian Minority

Russians form the largest minority on Ukrainian territory. It is true that the Russian population has been slowly decreasing, but probably it still amounts to-day to 5 000 000 i. e. a little less than 10 % of the entire population. According to the calculation of the Ukrainian Bureau for Statistics and Economics for 1933, the Russian minority in Central Ukraine amounted to 4 615 000 = 9.7 % and over the entire territory (including mixed zones) to 8 074 000 = 15 %. The number of Russians has decreased most in Soviet Ukraine, amounting to 2 677 200 or 9.2 % of the entire population in 1926. There are no Russians either in Galicia or Carpatho-Ukraine and in Bucovina less than 3 000. In North-West Ukraine, too, they scarcely ever amount to more than 2 % of the entire population and occur only in scattered groups in the towns of Volynia, Polesya and the Kholm District.

It is surprising that the percentage of Russians should be so low just on the ethnographical frontiers of Russia. These frontier areas of North Ukraine, Volynia, Podolia, and the former departments of Chernyhiv and Poltava are purely Ukrainian with a very small Russian population amounting to between 0.3 % — 1 %. The proportion of Russians in the entire Right Bank population amounts only to 2.6 % (in country districts alone, even to 0.7 % only).

North-West Ukraine and the colonised areas of Northern Caucasia, on the other hand, are mixed regions where Russians and Ukrainians are rivals for supremacy. In the eastern foothills of Ukrainian Northern Caucasia the proportion is 57.3 % Russians to 33.4 % Ukrainians; some places, too, in the Donets Basin are to be regarded as areas of Russian colonisation. But even here, in spite of official support, the Russians only count 31.4 % of the entire population and, in the towns, are constantly making way for more Ukrainians so that towns that used to be predominantly Russian had, in 1926 even, no more than 48.9 % Russians.

The proportion of Russians in the population south of Kursk and Voronesh and in the surroundings of Kharkiv is relatively large. It dates from the early 18th century and is supported by the Russian population in Kharkiv (37 %). The average figure for the Russian population of these areas amounts to 22.5 % of the entire population.

In spite of a considerable Russian population in the harbor towns, Ukrainians contribute largely to the population of the area round the Sea of Oziv and the Black Sea. It is true that there are still 663 000 Russians, but they are everywhere in the minority.

Proportion of Russians in Population

Rayon	general (%)	urban (%)	rural (%)
Melitopil	25.0	39.7	24.0
Odessa	23.3	38.1	8.2
Mariupil	18.5	46.7	10.6
Mykolajiv	15.7	39.5	9.9
Kherson	11.4	31.0	7.7
Autonomous Republic of Moldavia	8.5	23.3	6.5

In the industrial districts of the West (Kryvyj Rih, Zaporizha, and Dnipropetrovske), the proportion of Russians scarcely reached the figure for the entire Ukraine — it amounts to 8.9 % (25.1 % in the towns, 5 % in the country).

From the above it is obvious that the Russian population is greatest in large towns and industrial and mining areas. But the statement that the towns in Eastern Ukraine have a Russian majority must not be repeated for it was no longer true even

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in the second half of the 19th century. Even in those days the proportion of Ukrainians in the larger towns (with the exception of government capitals) amounted to 40.5 % (compared with 29.2 % Russians and 25.6 % Jews) and in the smaller towns to 52.4 % (compared with 21.8 % Russians and 21.0 % Jews). The total urban population in the Gouvernments of Chernyhiv, Poltava and Kharkiv had then a Ukrainian majority, while the Ukrainians were relatively in the majority in the towns in the Gouvernment of Katerynoslav.

This development has been continued. The census of 1925 produced even more favorable results: in the towns there were then 38.49 % Ukrainians, 29.4 % Jews, 27.22 % Russians, and 2.03 % Poles. 14 towns show a considerable majority of Ukrainians (up to 92.33 %); in 14 more the Ukrainians were relatively the strongest national group. The proportion of Ukrainians in the south also increased astonishingly, as may be seen from the figures for the harbor town of Mykolajiv (1897 = 8.8 %, 1923 = 17.5 % Ukrainians) or for Kherson (1897 = 19.5 %, 1920 = 40.4 %).

Jews

Before World War I there were 3795760 Jews, i. e. 8.2 % of the entire population of Ukraine. They were massed in the provinces that used to be Polish and were later Austro-Hungarian and also in the northern districts of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia where, at that time, they contributed 12.2—12.6 % of the entire population. There are most Jews in the east of Carpatho-Ukraine (more than 25 %), in the Kholm district (on an average 15.3 %), in the districts of Berdychiv (23.1 %), Odessa (22 %), Chernivtsi (21.4 %), Brest-Litovsk (20.8 %) and Pinsk (19.5 %). On the right bank of the Dnipro the Jewish share in the population was considerably smaller while on the left bank where Jews were forbidden to settle until the great Revolution, it was quite small; with the exception of Kharkiv it varied from 2—3 %.

The Jews lived for preference in the towns; in the country they were scattered as shop-keepers, inn-keepers, tenant farmers and artisans. But there were also a good number of towns where

162 the Jewish population was insignificant (e. g. Dmytrievsko 563 0.5 %, Vovchansk 1.1 %, Okhtyrka 1.3 %, Melitopil 3.4 %, Kamenske 4.1 %, Slovanske 4.4 %, Bila Tserkva 5.5 %, Berdiansk 8.1 %). Among the larger towns Stalino had 10.7 %, Kharkiv 19.5 % and Mykolajiv 21 % Jews.

For some time the number of Jews has been decreasing, partly as a result of emigration and partly because of the shifting of the peasant population. At the beginning of World War II there were probably about 2.5 million Jews. The last eight years have brought about a complete change and not even approximate figures can be given.

Poles

Official statistics list the Poles as third of the minorities in Ukraine. In 1914 they were responsible for 2 079 500 souls i. e. 4.5 % of the entire Ukrainian population. Of these 1 270 400 = 21.8 % were in Austrian and more than 809 000 = 2 % in Russian Ukraine (including the Kholm district and Volynia). At the outbreak of World War II there must have been 1 880 934 Poles (= 3.6 % of the entire population) on the Ukrainian ethnographical territory (1 608 900 in Poland, 246 034 in Soviet Ukraine and approximately 25 000 in Roumania). In the areas belonging to Poland they form about 18 % of the entire population and are more concentrated only in Lviv and the larger towns. In the foothills of the Carpathians, south of the Dnister, in spite of the vicinity of the ethnographical frontier, there were relatively few Poles (less than 5 % on the average in the west and less than 10 % in the east). Circumstances in Polessya and Volynia are similar. Nor have the towns in Western Ukraine a majority of Poles; in Lviv about half the population are Poles. In 1931 in all the towns in Eastern Galicia there were 26.9 % Ukrainians, in the administration area of Stanislaviv 33.8 % and in Podlakhia and Polesya 31.2 % and 31.64 respectively. In Eastern Ukraine there were 476 435 = 1.6 % Poles in 1926. They lived scattered only in 12 rayons of the Right Bank Ukraine, in Volynia and Podolia and, with the exception of Zhytomir (12.5 %) and Proskuriv (10.2 %) they accounted for less than 5 % of the entire population. 48.4 % of these

"Poles" listed Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (56.7 % even 162
in the country), while 7 % spoke Russian. 563 ●

Germans

The Germans, who cannot be very numerous in Ukraine to-day, amounted in 1914 to 871 270 souls = 1.9 % of the entire population. They lived mostly in three compact colonies (area round Black Sea, Kholm district, Volynia and Carpathian foot-hills). By 1935 they had decreased to 693 000 = 1.2 % of the entire population. In the Black Sea area they had an absolute majority in the rayons of Grossliebenthal, K. Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Prishib, Engels, Vysokopolje and Molotshna. Germans were settled in 12 of the 41 rayons of Soviet Ukraine. Most Germans lived in the country; there were communities of several thousand Germans in Odessa, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovske, Zaporizha and Mykolajiv.

Other minorities

The 460 000 Roumanians are to be found chiefly in the Moldavian Republic (0.89 %) where, however, they only constitute 30.1 % of the entire population (compared with 48.5 % Ukrainians). Otherwise Roumanians live in Bucovina and in the Bessarabian areas of Akkerman and Khotin.

The 160 000 Greeks live mostly in Mariupil and Stavropil.

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of General Denikin had occupied the Donets coalfields and was nearing Ekaterinoslav and Kharkov, while General Wrangel was advancing into the Volga basin from the northern Caucasus and on 30 June entered Tsaritsyn.

The Poles were taking advantage of the Russian Civil War by advancing into White Russia and Volhynia where, since April, they had been fighting with Bolshevik detachments which had been sent into the western Governments after the capture of Kiev from the 'Petlyurians'. Petlyura, also, had not exhausted his resources: his retreat into Podolia only served to renew his potentialities. At Kamenets-Podolsk, Petrushevich, 'the Dictator of Eastern Galicia', under pressure from the Poles, gave over the command of his own forces to Petlyura, and the latter now found himself at the head of about 40,000 men, of which some half were ex-soldiers of the old Austrian Army who had either come from Galicia or who were returning there from captivity in Russia. Among these former soldiers of Austria was a considerable number of officers, who were an important factor, since Petlyura's own men consisted only of armed peasants. Owing to the complete ruin of these lands and the impossibility of finding peaceful employment, service even in Petlyura's army had become a profession which at least procured food from day to day. Petlyura's troops were well armed out of the military stores which the Germans had abandoned or of which they had been deprived.

Some fighting with the Bolsheviks took place along the railway line Zhmerinka-Birzula, but what made the 'Petlyurian' campaign for ever memorable in Podolia was the extent and cruelty of their pogroms against the Jewish population. Pogroms began in January during the retreat of the 'Petlyurians' from the Kiev region when a particularly brutal slaughter took place at Belaya Tserkov. They continued in Podolia throughout the months of February, March and April, and what was probably the greatest pogrom of all time was enacted in the frontier town of Proskurov. The killings somewhat abated when the more disciplined Galician ex-soldiers became numerous in Petlyura's ranks.

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All the combatants in the Civil War of 1919 took part in Jewish pogroms—the bands of the 'free' *atamans*, the 'Petlyurians', the 'White' Volunteers, the Bolsheviks and the Poles, but the 'Petlyurians' undoubtedly distinguished themselves most in this direction. According to official Jewish sources (*Ostjüdische Archiven*, Berlin) the 'Petlyurians' killed off 17,000 persons; the 'free' *atamans* 8000; the Volunteer Armies are accused of having 5000 to their score; the Soviet troops 1000; and the Polish Army several hundreds (Autumn

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642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in
relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving 656
to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes 563
of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.'

The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise 731
engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the

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731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

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669 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

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642 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

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656 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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The predominance of the non-Ukrainian elements in the organs of administration and in educational institutions is of course explained by the fact that the Ukrainian people remained overwhelmingly peasant, and there had been in the nineteenth century, and even earlier, a large and heterogeneous alien element in the towns. Nevertheless Kaganovich, in his speech to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in 1927, was at pains to demonstrate the success of 'ukrainization'. 'Among us', he said with that graceful Jewish facility for identifying himself with the people among whom he had come, 'our Ukrainian culture has developed on a grand scale. Ukrainian culture has made such progress in all branches in these last years that even the most eager Ukrainian nationalists never dreamed of such rapid development. In primary schools Ukrainians are taught by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian language. The high schools are gradually becoming completely "ukrainized"; Ukrainian books and press are at present developing to an extent unknown in all the history of the Ukraine. In our Council of People's Commissars, which is the supreme administrative organ of our government, 13 out of 20 members are Ukrainian. In our Party's Executive Committee, 66 per cent are Ukrainians, 25 per cent are Russians, 14 per cent are Jews.'

Kaganovich's emphasis on the predominance of Ukrainians on the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party is, of course, meaningless, since in the Soviet hierarchy all power is vested in the Secretaries of the various regional and local Committees of the Communist Party, who are themselves responsible not to the members of the Committees but to the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Stalin filled this latter position, and Kaganovich himself was his nominee sent from Moscow with complete power over the regional and local Committees in the Ukraine. Kaganovich's successor, 'the dictator' Postyshev, who only occupied the position of 2nd Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was another importation from Moscow—as is Khrushchov, who is at present (1939) governing the Ukraine.

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While Kaganovich was praising 'the achievements of "ukrainization"' he was already considering means of putting some limit on these achievements. In this same year when he made his genial speech before the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party under his influence issued a decree making Russian the second official language in the Ukraine. The First Five Year Plan was then beginning, and one of the most important features of this Plan was the wide development of industry in the Ukraine. The coal and metallurgical industries

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appointed as First Counsellor in the four capitals (Vienna was included) 648 where the Ukrainians had had independent representation. This arrangement continued until 1925, when such appointments began to be considered only as 'desirable'. Ukrainian Communists soon vanished from important positions in the Soviet embassies and legations, and for the last thirteen years the Ukrainian S.S.R. has had not even the shadow of formal representation abroad.

(13) *The Ukrainians in Poland*

The Paris Conference, in 1919, only recognized the Polish occupation of 563 ● Eastern Galicia pending a solution of 'the Russian Question'. The Polish 668 position in Galicia was finally affirmed by the Council of the League of Nations (15 March 1923), but the Polish Government undertook to establish a 'gradual' autonomy for the Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia.

The Ukrainians claimed that not less than three and a half millions of the population of Eastern Galicia were of Ukrainian stock, and they reckoned another three millions in Western Galicia, the Kholm region, and the Polish districts of Polesia and Volhynia.

The Polish census of 1939 admitted only 1,600,000 Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, while the population of Russian origin in other regions of Poland was not allowed to be even in part Ukrainian. This great disparity in estimates can be explained by the fact that the Poles described as 'Russians' all those elements, formerly 'pro-Muscovite', who were lukewarm in their support of the separatist version of the Ukrainian national movement.

The Polish Government had some success in detaching from the Ukrainian nationalists a section of the rural population who were flattered by the discovery that they were in fact 'russified Polish *szlachta*'. It was affirmed that during the preceding two centuries many families of the lesser Polish nobility had become so impoverished that they had disappeared into the mass of the peasantry and had become the victims of systematic methods of russification. The movement of the so-called 'Szlachta Zagrodowa' (Smallholder Gentry) had great success, and the journal of the association, *Pobudki*, claimed recently that the number of 'russified *szlachta*' who were expected 'to return to the bosom of their mother Poland' amounted to 700,000 persons. Thus, if those who desired to remain Russian and those who desired to become Poles (together with real Poles, Jews, Armenians, and Germans) are deducted from the Ukrainian estimate, it will be found that the total number of *conscious* Ukrainians in all Galicia did not exceed two millions.

These two millions remain, however, an important factor in the Galician borderland where Polish, German, Russian, Roumanian and Hungarian interests are in dangerous conflict, and the energetic activities of Ukrainian groups and political parties continued to exercise a disturbing influence on the life of the Polish State during the whole period 1919–39.

The most important Ukrainian party is U.N.D.O. (The Ukrainian National Democratic Union (*Obyedinenie*)), which rose to importance about 1925 under the leadership of Dmitro Levitsky. The party could claim a membership of over one million, and it published a series of papers of which *Diio* (Action) in Lvov was the most important. The ultimate aim of

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U.N.D.O. was a united and independent Ukraine; but working within the structure of the Polish State the party refrained from advocating 'separatism at home' and claimed independence only for 'enslaved' Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet Government regarded U.N.D.O. as the most dangerous, because the most serious, of all Ukrainian political groups.

Relations between the Polish Government and U.N.D.O. were far from cordial during the years 1925–30. Both sides, however, were seeking compromise and the U.N.D.O. leaders, though they failed to acquire legalized autonomy, appeared temporarily satisfied with the position of *de facto* autonomy which they had attained through their social, educational and co-operative organizations (*Selsky Hospodar* (The Country Farmer), *Dnistr*, *Maslosoyuz* (Butter League), etc.). The policy of 'peace with Poland' was supported by the Ukrainian Catholic and Uniate organizations under the leadership of the Uniate Metropolitan, Count Szepticki with the periodicals, *Meta* (Aim), *Nedilya* (Week). On the other hand, certain fractions of U.N.D.O. maintained a hostile attitude towards the Polish Government, voiced in the papers *Nash Prapor* (Our Standard), *Nash Klych* (Our Warcry). Communist influences were noticeable in the propaganda of these fractions.

Abroad the U.N.D.O. was on the best of terms with the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic. Antagonism to Poland had become a tradition in Prague since 1920, when the passage of arms to Poland during the war with the Soviets had been refused. Ukrainian refugees, from both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia, were sure of a kindly reception in the Czech capital, which between the years 1925–35 became, if not the Ukrainian political centre, at least the cultural and educational focus where the idea of a Greater Ukraine, independent and sovereign, was openly preached in the high schools (in many of which special Ukrainian courses were available for students).

The intense interest shown by the leaders of the Third Reich in the Ukrainian problem—an interest which provoked the series of trials, banishments and executions in Soviet Ukraine—aroused the anxiety of the Polish Government. By no means confident of the loyalty of the population of Eastern Galicia, Kholm, and Volhynia, the Poles decided to accelerate the 'polonization' of these regions. This 'polonizing' process took unfortunate and sometimes arbitrary and violent forms: prohibition in some districts of the use of the Ukrainian or Russian languages, and the revival of the old struggle against the Orthodox and even against the Uniate Churches. A great number of Orthodox and Uniate churches were closed or 'turned back' into Catholic ones.

It would have been difficult to discover methods more likely to revive the age-old historic struggle 'for land and faith' between Poles and Ukrainians. A hatred of 'the Polish orientation' was quickly roused among the Ukrainian peasantry, and the moderate sections of U.N.D.O. with their policy of compromise began to lose ground. The U.N.D.O. party organization was forced to denounce the basis of conciliation reached in 1930 and confirmed in 1935. At the moment of the German attack on Poland, U.N.D.O. announced its loyalty to the Polish state, but the foundations of this loyalty had been sapped by the mistakes of the Polish politicians. It was Stalin, not Hitler, who reaped the benefit.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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From time to time the struggle between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia took an acute form and was accompanied by industrial strikes, peasant riots and acts of terrorism against the administration. These methods, violent and illegal, were not approved by U.N.D.O., but they were stimulated both by secret Communist organizations and by the unofficial Ukrainian Party which called itself the Ukrainian National Union (U.N.U.). U.N.U. repudiated all compromise with Poland, and proclaimed an armed struggle against her. Comparable in its organization and tactics to the I.R.A. (on which it was probably modelled to carry on a struggle in geographical and social conditions in some ways similar to those of Ireland), the U.N.U. organized a network of secret militarized groups all over Galicia. Galicia was looked on as a territory where the 'Army Corps' of U.N.U. was 'quartered': the territory was divided into four districts corresponding to 'Divisions', which were further divided into 'Regiments', 'Battalions' and 'Companies'. Some scores of thousands of men, young for the most part, and fanatically devoted to 'the cause', joined U.N.U.

At the head of the movement stood the bold and adventurous figure of Colonel Konovalets. A former officer of the Austrian Army, Konovalets had led the troops of the 'Directoria' which drove Skoropadsky from Kiev in December 1918. Later he had quarrelled with Petlyura on account of the latter's 'Polish orientation'.

Already in the twenties Konovalets had sought favour and aid in Germany. He was not the only one: about 1924 a certain Poltavets-Ostranitsa, who called himself 'Hetman', appeared in Munich with the same object. Konovalets, however, was much more successful than his rivals, and, towards 1930, he established firm relations with German political and military circles, and at the same time made really effective the secret organization of U.N.U. in Galicia. A newspaper of U.N.U., *Ukrainske Slovo* (Ukrainian Word) was published in Paris; other publications appeared in Germany.

The keen interest with which the Nazi leaders regarded the Ukrainian problem lent a serious meaning to the conspiratorial activities of Colonel Konovalets, who was not ashamed to express openly his 'German orientation'. In 1933 negotiations were set on foot between U.N.U. and representatives of the Nazi Party concerning 'preparatory measures' which were to be taken for the creation of a future 'Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian State'. The German negotiators were principally interested in the organization of a potential 'Ukrainian Government'. The lack of suitable candidates for political office among his own supporters led Konovalets to make contact with the remnants of Petlyura's followers, among whom several 'ex-cabinet ministers' were to be found. There was a project to open relations with Ukrainian nationalists who had remained in Soviet Ukraine, and Konovalets was also in touch with the former Hetman Skoropadsky, who was living at Wannsee near Berlin. Konovalets obviously aimed at organizing a 'united Ukrainian front', and the Ukrainians undoubtedly lost one who might have proved a resolute national leader, when the colonel was killed in a café in Rotterdam by the explosion of a bomb in the form of a cigarette-box which was handed to him by a man presumed to have been a Soviet agent.

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For U.N.U. the death of Konovalets was an even greater blow than it first appeared. Deprived of leadership, the organization began to go to pieces. The Polish police succeeded in arresting numbers of leaders of the regional organizations, and the movement's German supporters began to lose confidence in the conspiratorial method.

Both the moderate and the extremist Ukrainian political parties in Poland, the U.N.D.O. and the U.N.U., were born in Galicia in the atmosphere of the local political struggle. Distinct from these parties were the representatives of the erstwhile Ukrainian Popular Republic who had settled in Poland. This group continued to consider itself as the 'legal government' of Russian Ukraine with Andrew Levitsky as 'president' and several 'cabinet ministers' and 'diplomatic representatives' in different countries (Mazeppa, Prokopovich, A. Shulgin, General Salsky and others). Part of these 'Petlyurians' lived in Poland, others in Prague and Paris, where they published their periodical *Trizub* (Trident, the emblem on Vladimir's coins). Contrasting in this respect with the Galician political parties, which did not put their social programme in the first place, these former adherents of the 'Ukrainian Popular Republic', faithful to the traditions of the *Rada* and *Directoria*, had retained their socialist tendencies but in a very moderate form.

It is a curious fact that this group of 'the Ukrainian Popular Republic' enjoyed until recently not only the support of the Czech Government, with whose ideology it had much in common, but also that of the Polish Government, which at the same time was incapable of establishing normal durable relations with the Galician Ukrainians. The politicians of the U.P.R. kept themselves apart not only from the extremists of the U.N.U. but also from the moderates of the U.N.D.O. They did not of course preach separatism in regard to Poland, and as the years passed they became much more tolerant on the subject of the exact status of the Ukraine in the event of the downfall of the Soviet régime and the revival of a Russian state. Konovalets had tried to enlist them for 'the United Ukrainian front' patronized by the Third Reich, but such an orientation could scarcely attract the 'Petlyurians', penetrated by democratic and even socialist tendencies. Some of them remained faithful to the 'Polish orientation' of Petlyura himself, others struck up friendship with the Parisian group of *La Revue de Prométhée*—a periodical published by the representatives of different nationalities which had formed part of the Russian Empire and are now under Soviet dominion. *Les Prométhéens* are drastically opposed to the Soviet régime, denounce the absence of real autonomy in the Soviet Union and stand ultimately for a 'federal state of nationalities'. The Ukrainians who participate in this movement therefore abandon the idea of 'integral separatism' and profess opinions in the spirit of those expressed once upon a time by Michael Dragomanov.

Former 'Petlyurians' are at present less opposed to the ideas of which Hetman Skoropadsky was the symbol than they were at the time when they began their armed struggle against him. The ex-Hetman has retained a certain influence on Ukrainians and admirers of his title can be met in many parts of the world—in Paris and London, in Canada and the United States. His son Danylo is considered by them as 'the lawful successor' of the now ageing Paul.

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RDl Ukraine RDl

Outside Poland, Ukrainians are to be found in many European and American countries. Political and academic circles of Ukrainian intelligentsia are grouped round periodicals of varying views, but these circles consist of scores, perhaps, of persons out of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian land labourers who have migrated from over-populated Galicia. After the war and revolution thousands of fugitives from the South of Russia and Volhynia joined them. In the Ukrainian press from time to time appear statements that the number of Ukrainians in Western Europe reaches 500,000, in Canada over a million, in the United States about 700,000 and in South America 200,000. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. In France the number of refugees from the South of Russia who can be considered 'Ukrainians' did not exceed a few scores of thousands, and the same must be said about Czechoslovakia and Balkan countries. However, among the Polish agricultural workers and miners in France (900,000) a third came from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia. And there is no doubt that hundreds of thousands have migrated from Galicia to the United States and especially to Canada where, owing to hard work and a certain capacity for organization, brought over from their native land, many have attained prosperity. America is the land where emigrants from Europe keep together according to their nationality more than anywhere else. The Ukrainian emigration in Canada and the United States has retained a vivid interest in everything pertaining to Ukrainian nationality. It has its own press, publishes its books, teaches its language and history in its schools. The Ukrainians in America consider it their duty to respond to the appeals of the different Ukrainian parties and groups which have remained in Europe. Therefore echoes of all the different tendencies of Ukrainian political life can be found in Canada and the United States: 'pro-Russians' who do not wish to be called 'Ukrainians', adherents of U.N.D.O., followers of Colonel Konovalets, partisans of Petlyura and the 'Petlyurians', admirers of 'the young Hetman' Danylo Skoropadsky. However, purely ideological discussions are not so acute there as among the different 'fractions' in Europe. 'The united Ukrainian front' would have a better chance in emigration, because its basis would not be so much political activity, as a common historical tradition and a common love of the Ukrainian land.

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(14) *Literature on the Ukrainian Question*

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Numerous papers, mostly by well-known Ukrainian writers and political leaders, have appeared in the *Slavonic and East European Review*. These papers have made available to English readers information on various aspects of the Ukrainian Question. The following should be noted:

Vol. v, No. 13, p. 169, Kolessa, A., 'Bibliography of the Ukrainian Language'.
IX, No. 27, p. 367, Paneyko, B., 'Galicia and the Polish-Ukrainian Problem'.
Ibid. p. 88, Skorowski, S., 'The Ukrainian Problem in Poland'.
x, No. 28, p. 116, Loś, S., 'Ukrainian Question in Poland'.
Ibid. p. 138, Borshak, E., 'Relations of England and Ukraine.'
XII, No. 35, p. 323, Mazepa, I., 'Ukrainia under Bolshevist Rule' (valuable, based on careful study of the Ukrainian Soviet press).
Ibid. No. 36, p. 622, Doroshenko, D., 'The Uniat Church in Galicia'.

563 Rumania ED1

[For information on the status of Ukrainians within Rumania, 1940-41, see 5: Manning, RD1 Ukraine, cat. 116, pp. 165-166. --Analyst]

186 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian
563 population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a
[316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to
668 be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise,
565 when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in
668 Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

After the expulsion of the Soviet Forces from Western 636
Ukraine in 1920, the territory, including Eastern Galicia and Lviv, 563
had remained under Polish rule and had been subjected to a policy of Polonization and colonization by a Polish population. There had been during the period between the wars many clashes and much unpleasantness between the two nationalities and the ill will thus generated promised disastrous consequences for Poland in case of a new war. At the same time the Polish domination had never threatened the fundamental forms of Ukrainian social life, as had been the case in the UkSSR; the Ukrainians had a certain representation in the Polish Parliament, and they had been allowed, despite hindrances, to develop their own economic life. With the possible exception of the one district of Boryslav, there was very little Communism among the population, who were well aware of the handicaps under which their brothers in the UkSSR were living. At the same time the Nazi refusal to support the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine in the spring of 1939 had placed them on their guard against the Nazis.

Thus, when World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, [661]
the revolt of the Ukrainians which many Poles expected did not [726]
take place. However, the Polish government in the first days arrested and placed in concentration camps many of the Ukrainian leaders but they were freed by the rapid advance of the German forces and the Polish retreat, which forced into Lviv and the neighborhood many thousands of refugees.

On August 23, 1939, when the Nazis and the Soviets signed a 728
non-aggression treaty, it was provided that if Poland were disintegrated, Germany and the USSR would divide the territory

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

The Western Ukrainian Reaction

000 To appreciate the next step in the relations between the Western Ukrainians and the Soviets, it is necessary to go back and look briefly at the conditions that existed under Polish rule. The two peoples were distinctly hostile but their relations were very different from those between the Eastern Ukrainians and the Russians.

● 563 The old Austro-Hungarian Empire, unlike the Russian, had not denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, even though it had not favored their development save as a counterbalance to the Poles in Eastern Galicia. Yet there was a considerable number of Western Ukrainians who had been trained to fill the lower offices in the old Hapsburg system. They had the right of voting for the provincial diets and when the Hapsburg Empire disintegrated, they immediately voted for the establishment of a Western Ukrainian Republic. When this failed to establish itself and to win recognition by the Western powers and the League of Nations, the vast majority of the Western Ukrainians under the leadership of the UNDO voted for representatives to the Polish Parliament and continued the struggle in a legal and parliamentary manner to win rights for themselves.

668 A minority which was finally organized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Col. Evhen Konovalets continued the illegal and revolutionary struggle through sabotage and terroristic attacks on outstanding anti-Ukrainian Poles. It was in vain that the Polish government endeavored to suppress this group by the forced pacification of Eastern Galicia and by other violent tactics and, after the murder of Colonel Konovalets, his place was taken by Colonel Melnyk.

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5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER NINETEEN

The Soviets and the Ukrainians in Rumania

648 The agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union[1]
563 had stated that the former was not interested in the fate of Bukovyna and Bessarabia, both of which contained a large Ukrainian population. It was therefore obvious that once the Soviet hands were freed from the Soviet-Finnish war, they would endeavor to acquire these additional territories.

In both Bukovyna and Bessarabia the Ukrainian cause had been less developed, although there had been far more work in Bukovyna than in Bessarabia, which had been under Russian rule. The Ukrainian uprising in Chernivtsy had not been successful in 1918 and when the territory was added to Rumania, that country put a stop to all Ukrainian work, including education although a Ukrainian theatre had developed and there was considerable secret work being done.

As a result, there was a sense of stagnation which was very different from the situation in the lands under Poland. There was less sense of coordination and when in June, 1940, the Soviets requested Rumania to hand over the new provinces, Rumania had only to submit. Most of Bukovyna and the part of Bessarabia inhabited by Ukrainians were annexed to the UkSSR. The rest of Bessarabia was added to the Moldavian ASSR, which was later raised to the dignity of a Union Republic and intended for propaganda use against Rumania.

The Soviet policy was then much the same as it had been in
648 the area taken over from Poland. There was the same amount of
631 propaganda declaring the "liberation" of the country from the Rumanian nobles and from international capitalism. There was

[1] [1939--Analyst]

[164 blank]

648 the same voting for annexation to the USSR, the same enthusiastic
631 reception in Moscow, and the same process of nationalization, of
the arrest of outstanding figures, and the same destruction of the
established forms of life in both areas.

The Soviets were, however, less advanced in these provinces for the application of their system required time and their stay in the area was eight months less than it was in the territory taken from Poland.

The anti-Communist leaders fled either into Rumania proper
[668] or Germany or made their way to the Polish Government General
in Krakow. On the other hand, despite the attempts to seal off the country, the OUN found ways of extending its influence into Bukovyna and appealed to the more alert classes of the population.

In general the Ukrainians in these two areas formed rather a
● 563 secluded enclave in the general mass of Ukrainian history and they
did not play a role in proportion to their numbers. They thus scarcely enter into the account, although for a while, in 1941, there was organized a force of some 2,000 who sought to impede the Rumanian return to the country. Yet, their opposition was fruitless and when they endeavored to cut their way out, they were either destroyed by the Germans or dispersed.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places
they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between 517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in [563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,[1] Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 665 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representatives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

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[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

[1] [see category 116, p 14--Analyst]

p. 46

III. RETRENCHMENT AND REVOLT

● 563 BY THE END of September, 1939, it appeared that Germany had definitely abandoned the Ukrainian nationalists. The agreement which allowed the Soviet Union to occupy the territory of Poland up to the line of the Bug and the San meant in effect that the compact Ukrainian area in Galicia, the Ukrainian land which possessed the strongest nationalist feeling, had passed under the control of the Soviet regime. There remained, however, a few small areas of Ukrainian settlement under German control in what was now designated as the Generalgouvernement Polen. Aside from several minute border districts, these were the Lemko region and the Chelm (Kholm) region. The Lemko area is a rugged stretch on the northern slope of the Carpathians, extending from Przemysl (Peremyshl') almost to Cracow. The majority of its population was a hardy if impoverished group of mountaineers who spoke the Lemko dialect of the Ukrainian language. Under the Polish regime this group had been subjected to the same repression which was exercised against the population of eastern Galicia, but the low economic potential of the area discouraged the Poles from expanding significantly into the hill region.

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795 In the Chelm district, on the other hand, a violent policy of denationalization had been carried out. This area, which had always contained a mixed population, was further complicated ethnographically by changes in religion. Originally a large part of the population, including the great majority of the Ukrainians, had been Greek Catholic, as were their brothers in Galicia. Under Alexander II, however, a harsh policy of repression had prevailed, the aim of which was the destruction of the Greek Catholic Church and strengthening of the Orthodox Church. Numerous Greek rite parishes were forcibly transferred to the Orthodox Church,

and a number of Latin rite churches which were accused of ministering to Greek Catholics who resisted transfer to Orthodoxy were also seized.[1] Either because they originally had some sympathy for Orthodoxy, or because they became accustomed to it over the decades, many of the "converted" congregations had retained some ties with it after the area had become a part of Poland. Stimulated by part of the Latin clergy (the Greek Catholic hierarchy opposed the step), the Polish government seized many of the churches or, in some cases, even burnt them to the ground. The Orthodox priests were expelled and replaced by Catholic pastors of the Latin, not the Greek, rite. The small supply of intellectuals made it difficult for other Ukrainian communities to aid the Ukrainians of Chelm, and, as a result, the policy of denationalization had considerable success.[2] 563 795

For over twenty months these small and handicapped areas^1 were to serve as the principal territorial base of Ukrainian nationalist efforts. The reason that they were able to fulfill this function arose from the deliberately ambiguous nature of German policy toward the Ukrainian movements during this period. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was a formal barrier to the use of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment to disrupt the Soviet Union, was, indeed, merely regarded as a truce by the Nazi leaders, but the duration of the truce was viewed as indefinite. Any overt encouragement of the Ukrainian nationalists would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as an unfriendly gesture, if not as preparation for an attack; consequently, Hitler was determined to use extreme caution in dealing with the Ukrainians as long as he felt that amicable relations with the Soviet Union were in his interest.[3] At the same time, the Machiavellian strain in Nazi 1668*

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[1] Adrien Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie: Leurs Relations Diplomatiques au XIX° Siecle* (Paris: Editions Spès, 1925), II, 440.

[2] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 335; Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 279n; and especially Volodymyr Kubiiovych, "Die ukrainische Volksgruppe," *Das Generalgouvernement*, I (December, 1940), 14–19.

[3] This is shown not only by Hitler's express order to exercise caution in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in order to avoid difficulties with Russia (Memorandum for the files concerning the session of the RVA [Reichsverteidigungsausschuss], Warsaw, March 2, 1940, EC 300; hereafter referred to as EC 300), but also by the fact that even much later he requested Bormann

1 [Lemko and Chelm regions -- Analyst]

668* thinking impelled the German rulers to regard Ukrainian nationalism as an ace in the hole for future contingencies. In order to maintain its vigor, it was necessary to give it a certain minimum of encouragement, however indirect and covert.

● 563 Moreover, the presence of several hundred thousand Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement offered the opportunity to put into practice another favorite maxim of the Florentine theorist: *Divide et impera.*[4] The aim of this principle as adapted to Nazi policy was the destruction of the national consciousness of the peoples of the Generalgouvernement, so that they might be absorbed in the "higher" German nation if "racially suitable" or maintained as docile Helots if they were "biologically inferior." The first step in this policy was to splinter the nationalities by promoting a feeling of ethnic distinctiveness in each subgroup and by favoring the smaller groups in the appointment of local civil and police authorities.[5] In line with this policy, the small Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement was to be favored at the expense of the Poles, who were regarded as the most dangerous opponents of German interests in this area. In March, 1940, Hitler expressed his personal eagerness to utilize the anti-Polish attitude of the Ukrainians. In order to avoid difficulties with the Soviet Union, however, he directed that no "Ukrainian national party" or similar wide representation be formed but that their role be confined to a consultative one within the Generalgouvernement.[6] In line with this dictum, Frank, the chief of the Generalgouvernement administration, told his subordinates a month later that, while he would by no means permit the founda-

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to see that Leibbrandt's work UdSSR (which was strongly pro-Ukrainian) not be spread even among Nazi members, since it might fall into the wrong hands with bad results for German-Russian relations (Bormann to Rosenberg, November 25, 1940, CXLIII 258, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine; hereafter referred to as CXLIII 258.)

[4] The exact phrase employed by Governor Frank to describe his policy toward the nationalities in the Generalgouvernement (Extracts from the diary of Hans Frank, Abteilungsleitersitzung, Cracow, April 12, 1940, p. 6, USSR Exhibit 223; hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 223.)

[5] Memorandum containing the general policy outlined by Himmler and approved by Hitler on the treatment of the Eastern Peoples, May, 1940, NO 1880 (hereafter referred to as NO 1880). Actually, Himmler wanted to split the Lemkos off from the main body of Ukrainians; there is no evidence that any substantial effort was made to do so, however.

[6] EC 300.

tion of an extensive national community organization by the 563 ●
Ukrainians, he could allow the formation of a self-help and welfare organization.[7]

The Nazi tactic envisaged using Ukrainian national feeling as a counterweight to Polish sentiment to bolster German rule in the Generalgouvernement. After the Poles had been destroyed as a national entity, then the Ukrainians, too, would be absorbed by the Germans or reduced to Helot status. Because the first stage 668*
of the process required a lenient attitude toward the Ukrainians, however, it was possible for nationalist groups in the Generalgouvernement to carry on limited but significant activity. Several months before Hitler had made his decision concerning the formation of a Ukrainian welfare body, the Ukrainians of the Generalgouvernement themselves proceeded to create a rudimentary national organization. This step was not prevented because a number of the subordinate officials, particularly Dr. Fritz Arlt, the chief of the nationalities section in the Generalgouvernement, realized the need for securing the friendship of the Ukrainians and endeavored to use their superiors' purely tactical leniency toward this group to grant the Ukrainians a measure of national expression.[8]

The organizational work was begun with the construction of a [623]
wide variety of community organizations wherever considerable numbers of Ukrainians were found. For example, a Ukrainian National Council was formed in the San River area, a Ukrainian National Committee in Jaroslaw (Iaroslav), and a Ukrainian Central Committee in Chelm.[9] At first there appeared to be a certain amount of rivalry between these centers, which were evidently improvised by local groups without much consideration of broader political interests.[10] The more far-sighted elements of the Ukrainian group in the Generalgouvernement were anxious, however, to establish as strong a position as possible, and realized

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[7] USSR Exhibit 223.

[8] This statement is based on interviews with German officials concerned and with Ukrainians who were the beneficiaries of their temperate policy toward the Ukrainian community. Interviews 8, 11, 36, 46.

[9] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 29, 1942, p. 3.

[10] I have no substantial evidence that the incipient conflict in the OUN created any difficulties at this stage of the development of community organization.

[214] of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of
204 Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication
668* of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

● 563 From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favor-
178 able policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural develop-
871 ment was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

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[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

To round out the picture, however, one must add that the 563 methods employed by the Ukrainians to win ground back from 668* the Poles were not limited to cultural development. In line with the policy described above, the Germans frequently appointed mayors of ethnographically mixed towns from among the Ukrainian element, thus giving the latter a decided advantage in the [625] civil administration. The separate police system was also staffed in a manner favorable to the Ukrainians, although the Germans closely supervised this force. Nevertheless, in numerous cases their position in the police detachments enabled the Ukrainians to harass and even to attack the Poles.[20]

While the Ukrainian nationalist forces were being strengthened 668* by the creation of a new base in the Generalgouvernement, the 578 OUN was being gravely weakened by a fierce internal conflict. The fundamental causes of this conflict have been examined in the preceding chapters. Its catalytic element was the liberation of the most active leaders of the younger generation from the Polish prisons.

In Cracow, where most went, they came into contact with the comrades with whom they had fought and suffered before their imprisonment, and a new grouping rapidly coalesced. The nominal leader was Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi, who was the official director of the *krai* OUN—i.e., the organization on Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland.[21] Along with him came other young men who had long been active in the struggle against the Polish authorities—John Gavrusevych, Iaroslav Horbovyi, Leo Rebet, and many others. For the most part these men, vigorous as they were, had been confined, by the nature of their conspiratorial work, to Poland, and consequently were not very familiar with the broader aspects of the OUN. They were a hardened group of rebels, remarkably courageous and inured to a life of insecurity, but deprived by this very training of

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[20] Activity report of the chief of the Ordnungspolizei, November 11, 1940, Occ E-2 (11), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-2 [11]). This German official reported that "lack of proper training" enabled the Ukrainian auxiliary police to take a partisan, even a vicious attitude toward the Poles, and gave as an example the necessity of arresting two Ukrainian officers who had failed to hinder attacks on Poles by armed Ukrainians.

[21] Interviews 24, 75.

decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There 727
is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to 466
the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a 167
large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans 727
in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. 466
They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers 167
and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase 523 ●
their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, 727
force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and 466
women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on 167
September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

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[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutennant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633
the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563
tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633
greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186
responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propapreviously described.[3] Under the conditions of German repression 668* the nationalist parties could not afford to devote their limited strength to maintaining the initial advantage gained in these comparatively unimportant areas. By 1943, under the impact of rapidly growing Soviet partisan operations, nationalist activity seems to have ceased in Polessia west of the Dnieper.

South of Polessia runs a broad band of territory which falls into 133 the natural vegetation region of the wooded steppe, i.e., a region of mixed prairie and woods. In contrast to the rather poor gray soil of most of Polessia, it is a land well suited for intensive agriculture, and as a result has supported for centuries the densest agricultural population of the East Ukraine.

As in the case of Polessia, the principal dividing line within the 631 wooded steppe region is the Dnieper River. The area west of the river forms the heart of what have been known in Ukrainian history as the "Right Bank" lands. Kiev and the surrounding district had been acquired by the Russian tsar in the eighteenth century, but most of the area west of the Dnieper remained under Polish rule until 1792. The section closest to the river had had a considerable share in the Cossack tradition, but the more westerly sections, which were included in the historic provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, were deeply affected by the independent Cossack movement only during the height of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's career. This meant that serfdom had a longer and more [566] oppressive history there than in the regions to the south and the east. While the peasants were thoroughly Ukrainian in language [563] ● and customs, the cities included many Poles and Russians and an especially high percentage of Jews, who comprised from one third to one half of the urban population. This concentration of Jews, too, was a result of the historical background of the region; Poland had tolerated them, while the tsars had forbidden them to leave the Pale formed by the lands acquired in 1793 and later.[4]

Since the "Right Bank" was immediately contiguous to the 668* nationalist bases in the West Ukraine, it was natural that the na-

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[3] See Chapter V.

[4] Actually, the Pale included all the Ukraine in the nineteenth century, but Jews were less numerous on the "Left Bank."

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[133] 175 culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe ● [563] was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[32]

369 The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population 369 lay in this region.[33] At the start of the period of industrialization, 563 in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[34] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

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[32] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[33] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[34] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were 369
even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the population.[35] 563

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon 186
which to base generalizations.[36] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a nationalist editor.[48] 186

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926. 361

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Transnistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any 727 523

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[48] Interview 10; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

737 rate, with Rumanian encouragement, it was bitterly anti-Ukrain-
●523 ian, adopting the slogan, "The Ukraine never was, is not, and never will be."[53]

668* Since this group and its Rumanian backers controlled all aspects of cultural and public life, any open Ukrainian nationalist activity even of a cultural nature was suppressed. A clandestine publication and a considerable amount of postwar testimony indicate that the OUN-B maintained a strong underground organization, started by a division of the southern task force even before Rumanian occupation began and later reinforced from the headquarters in Dniepropetrovsk.[54] They are said to have been able to operate an illegal printing press in Odessa and to have kept a nucleus group there.[55] A great deal of their attention was directed to the Rumanian-occupied rural areas to the north, and especially to southern Podolia, where they conducted a propaganda effort to induce the Ukrainian villagers to resist colonization by Moldavians.[56]

To the east, the southern part of the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev was more open to Ukrainian activity. The mayor of Nikolaev was a Mel'nyk adherent.[57] In the second-largest city of the area, Kherson, the Bandera group built a considerable organization, including the assistant mayor and the police chief, but was apparently liquidated by the SP by the end of 1941.[58] Nevertheless, the mayor, apparently an ethnic German, assisted the Ukrainian intellectuals in organizing cultural activity many months after the OUN-B had been suppressed.[59] The newspaper, too, is said to have been edited by a nationalist journalist.[60] In this city and the *Bezirk* capital, the Autonomous Church was active, having formed

[53] Interview 18.

[54] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu do Chorne More* (The Raid of the Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 48 ff.; Interview 18; clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[55] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45.

[56] Clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[57] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, October 2, 1941, pp. 3–4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[58] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, January 14, 1942, p. 30, NO 3279 (hereafter referred to as NO 3279).

[59] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 5, 1943, p. 6.

[60] Interview 42.

668* "all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to
369 be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

●563 As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural
[204] population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

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[65] PS 051.

[66] Interview 66.

[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.

[68] Interview 66.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

attractive town not only of the Ukraine but of the whole 361
of Russia. Its magnificent public gardens amaze the visitors. It is excelled by Odessa from the point of view of town organization but excels it by far from the æsthetic point of view. Its[1] University of St. Vladimir and its [874]
Polytechnic School enjoyed a great reputation in Russia.

Among the other towns with a European appearance one can mention Nicolaiev, the port at the mouth of the Boug; Vinnitza, the capital of Podolia, and to-day perhaps Dniepropetrovsk, which has the School of Mines, founded some years before the Great War. These cities have modern public buildings, up-to-date railway stations, good networks of tramways, etc.

In the domain of the organization and the appearance of the towns and the houses, the difference between Zone 1 and 2[2] is great. In Zone 1 the country-side is better organized and possesses better roads, while the telephone system had appeared there before the last war, etc. On the other hand the towns which, as we have already shown, are almost all small, can hardly be called such at all.

The towns of Zone 2[2] are new towns which have had the benefit of modern organization, while the country-side still has a colonial appearance, without roads, with numerous isolated hamlets and farms, far removed from each other.

Now a few words about the ethnical composition of 162
the population of the Ukraine. The most important 583
minorities living on Ukrainian territory are the following:

First of all the Great Russians; workers, officials, and some colonists in the eastern and southern parts, especially in the New Russia. Then the Jews, very numerous (about 2,500,000), almost all traders, artisans, or members of the free professions before the Revolution; to-day employees in commerce, in the State co-operatives

[1] [Kiev--Analyst]

[2] [see category 116, pp. 139-140---Analyst]

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

162 523 where they represent 30 per cent of the employees, artisans, and workers in heavy and light industry.

The Germans, mostly agriculturalists, very rich before the Revolution, are concentrated in the districts of Odessa, Kherson, and in Northern Taurida.

According to information from German sources, and especially according to articles which had recently appeared in *Deutschtum im Auslande*, the number of German colonists in these regions had been, in 1914, about 750,000, of whom only 50,000 to 60,000 inhabited the great towns. Before the Revolution 2,500,000 hectares belonged to them. It is after 1840 that German colonization became intensified in the New Russia. Originally the Imperial Government had granted 600,000 hectares of excellent land to the colonists. Thanks to their labour and to the favourable economic conditions after 1840 and right up to 1914, the German colonists were able to acquire nearly 2,000,000 hectares at the expense of private owners descended from the nobility.

563 The German colonists always lived quite apart from the peasant community, enjoying a special legislation which granted them very important privileges in economic matters, especially in all that concerned the rights of succession. They had powerful economic organizations such as the Land Bank of Kherson (with a branch at Odessa) and numerous credit and trading co-operatives. In cultural and religious matters the German colonists also remained separated from their Ukrainian and Great Russian partners. Catholic and reformed parish schools were to be found in almost every German village, of whom some even possessed secondary schools and especially *Realschulen* based on the German schools of the same name, in which, though the general teaching was in Russian, German history and German geography had a predominant place.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Nevertheless, if the economic level of the German 563 colonists was much higher than that of the Ukrainian peasants, their cultural level always remained very low. The majority among them were distinguished by coarseness and extreme obscurantism.

That which remains of this important minority, partly repatriated to the fatherland, dispersed by the Civil War, or exterminated as *koulaks*,[1] belongs to-day to the community of collective peasants.

The Poles are not numerous in the Soviet part of the Ukraine. The landowners have left the country. There remain the farmers, the workers, and the employees, especially in the service of the railway.

In Polish Galicia the Ukrainian population is, as everywhere, almost entirely agrarian. The Poles are the landowners, the officials, and the military. The Jews are traders, industrialists, and members of the free professions.

This division of activity according to the ethnical groups has played a very great role in the political struggle which had developed in the Ukraine during the period of the civil war of 1917–20. The native population had always been hostile to other non-Russian nationalities, not as a result of an instinctive or infused xenophobia, but for reasons of a purely social order. The Poles were landowners to them, the Jews traders and bankers, and the Germans privileged foreigners to whom one had granted the lands to the detriment of the native population.

Besides these important minorities it is equally necessary to note the Bulgarian colonists, as well as the Moldavians and Macedonians, whose most important occupation was the cultivation of vegetables and especially the growing of melons, as well as sheep rearing,

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[1] Rich peasants.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

563 and the Greeks who competed with the merchant Jews in the great ports, where they formed very united and wealthy autonomous communities which to-day have been repatriated or dispersed.

II

Agriculture

241 Fundamentally an agricultural land, the Ukraine is particularly the land of cereals.

The incomparable richness of these lands, her temperate climate, and the aptitude of her population have made this branch of human activity the fundamental wealth of the country.

134 With the exception of the forest regions of the north-
311 west, where sandy soil is met, nearly all the lands of the Ukraine are arable and actually only a few tens of thousands of hectares of waste land remain, which serve as natural pasturages and give an excellent hay which is very well suited for horses.

243 About 25,000,000 hectares are sown, of which 20,000,000 are growing cereals.

The abundance of nitrates in the surface layer of the earth, and its capillary structure, perfect for irrigation, allow the cultivation of the most valuable of cereals—
[311] wheat. The area that has been sown with this cereal occupies more than 35 per cent of the worked land of the Ukraine and its production rises to 90,000,000 quintals, representing almost 8 per cent of the world harvest and 18 per cent of the European harvest.

The cultivation of wheat seems to develop from year to year at the expense of barley and of rye, cereals of inferior quality.

From the end of the nineteenth century wheat has

2. Soviet Russia and Democratic Ukraine

668 Bolshevism was the consequence of the previous development of the Russian people, who never had had in their history any free political order. Soviet dictatorship did not meet with any serious resistance in Russia proper. The Russians showed in their attitude towards the Communist rule their traditional 'sense of obedience', as it was expressed by a Russian publicist (Guber, *On the Change of the Sign-Posts:* Prague, 1922)*). Another situation arose in Ukraine and other non-Russian regions of the former Tsarist Empire. The Russian Communist organisation in Ukraine was weak and had no support among the Ukrainian population. Among the Russian and Jewish workers in Ukraine the influence of Democratic Socialism, '*Menshevism*', also predominated. Thus, under the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council all parties, Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish and Polish, acted together against the plans of the Russian Bolsheviks to establish dictatorship in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Central Council blamed Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia, 668 631 and began to realise the autonomous order in Ukraine, independent of the Soviet Russian Government. In its '*III. Universal*' from November 20, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed Ukraine a democratic republic. In this document we read:

"In the Ukrainian Democratic Republic all liberties will be guaranteed: freedom of speech, printing, religion, meetings, associations, strikes, inviolability of person and domicile, the right to ● [563] use local languages in intercourse with all offices. The Ukrainian nation had fought for long years for its national liberty, and now having attained it, will firmly protect the freedom of national development of all nationalities remaining in Ukraine; therefore we announce to the Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples in Ukraine a national and personal autonomy to secure their right and liberty of self-government in matters of their national life . . ."

In the III. Universal the Ukrainian Central Council fixed the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly for December 27, 1917.

The Ukrainian Government did not want to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers which the Russian Communist Government under Lenin's direction was aiming at. Therefore the Ukrainian Central Council in its '*Universal*' of November 20, 1917,

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*) The well known Russian writer Maxim Gorki wrote on the passivity of the Russians towards their oppressors that the "Russians could suffer more than work consciously and honestly" (*Communist International*, No. 3, Moscow 1919).

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian 665
territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discon- [563] ●
tent among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The represen- 565
tatives of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated
[661] the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parliament
668 and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian
National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians
186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the
642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government. 726

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social-Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman. 642 563

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of 669 [1105]

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563
disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661
Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871]
In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories,
the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian
University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was
suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission
of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily
diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed
in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants
were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish
Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only
of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665]
and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians
of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices
at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre
(UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the
leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist
Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727
the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474
Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form
of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563
Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative
societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz).* The Ukrainian co-operative
movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of
Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more
than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Cooperation
(Maslosoyuz), supplied dairy products, not only for
the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries
of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563
the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants
were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

●563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine,
adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the
563 population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
[725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

The Polish policy aimed at the disintegration of the national life 563
of the 6 million Ukrainians through attempts to divide them into 661
different 'tribes' which were given various names in official statistics: 798
'Polishchuk', 'Hutsul', 'Ruthenian', 'Boyko', 'Lemko', and
even 'Orthodox' and 'Aborigines'. Against the Orthodox as well as against the Greek Catholic Ukrainians a policy of systematic Polonisation was applied by forcible conversion of the Ukrainians to Roman Catholicism which in the conditions of the Polish State was equivalent to Polonisation. In Ukrainian regions the Poles organised on the eve of World War II 'dragonnades' in order to convert the Greek Orthodox Ukrainians to the Roman Catholic Church: armed Polish gangs drove through the villages, destroyed the Orthodox Churches, beat the Ukrainians, looted their property, and forced them by this terrorism to turn Catholic. Thus the Polish Chauvinists protected by the Polish Government destroyed in 1938 more than 100 Ukrainian Churches, among them many medieval and of great artistic value and forced many Ukrainian communities to accept Roman Catholicism. In vain the Ukrainian deputies to the Polish Diet protested against this Polish violence, in vain the Metropolitan of the Greek Orthodox Church in Poland Dionysios and the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church in Lviw Count Szeptycki rose their voices. The Polish oppression caused a strong opposition and resistance among the Ukrainians in Poland, which the Polish Government tried to suppress by new persecutions.

In the entire Polish policy between the two World Wars the fear 000
of the Ukrainian national movement is undoubtfully apparent. The Polish Government did not wish the creation of an independent Ukraine, fearing that a Ukrainian state would later demand union with the Ukrainian provinces of Poland. Even the small Carpatho-Ukraine, which had proclaimed its autonomy in autumn 1938, seemed dangerous to Poland as giving a 'bad example' for the Ukrainian population in Poland. This was one of the reasons why the Polish Government helped to destroy Czechoslovakia and supported the Hungarian claims on Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939.

In September 1939, the Ukrainian territories which after the 661
Treaty of Riga were under Polish rule, were occupied by the Soviet 563
Army in accordance with the German-Russian Pact of August 23, 1939, signed in Moscow. This 'liberation of Western Ukraine' brought to the population of these territories a time of terror and oppression. Thousands of Ukrainians of all classes were deported to the East, many of them did not come back.

The local Ukrainian Communists also were suspected by the Soviet authorities, they were not admitted to influential positions and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism.'

563 423 474 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule
(Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 661 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR. The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In [illegible] Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population
of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina
and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist
terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians
there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian
population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR.
The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia
were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563 ●
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian
population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The
towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities
in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia)
favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile
group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used
a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian
languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary
and received support from Budapest too. The entire administration
in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech
bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine
was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR,
but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its
realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against
Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country,
(Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The
Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a
federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government
recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and
Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed
the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with
Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied
Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian
volunteers.

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

●563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end
of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for
the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the
Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged
to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%.
The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region
belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for
their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the
Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
[517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia
of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created
their Military Council and their Military Government. In October
1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council',
with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region,
and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-
Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167
had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest:
to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563
slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873
recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815]
University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563
Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186
remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563
tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575
are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda.* The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will.* There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162
mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in
Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563
munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575
means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

[668] like *Ukrainian Daily News* in New York. However, the Com-
● 563 munist agency in America and Canada did not attain the success it
575 had hoped. Among the Ukrainian emigration, the democratic orga-
nisations have decisive influence.

In South America too, in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, there are Ukrainian emigrants. These are mostly workers and farmers. They have their cultural and political organisations and publish periodicals in Ukrainian.

The central organisations of the Ukrainians in USA, Ukrainian Congress Committee (UCC), in Canada, Canadian Ukrainian Committee (CUC) and of the countries of South America, created in 1948 the Pan-American Ukrainian Conference for the co-ordination of their activities in the interest of the oppressed Ukrainian people.

132 49·3°. Drawbacks for agriculture in New Russia are the prevalence of north and east winds and an irregular and insufficient rainfall. The average rainfall at Yelisavetgrad is 17 in., at Odessa 16 in., at Lugansk 15 in., and at Nikolaev 14 in. The rains in April and May decide the harvest. June is the rainiest month, but from May to September there are droughts. Most places are largely dependent upon wells and ponds constructed in the ravines, which are frequent on the steppes.

The climate of the Ukraine, as a whole, is therefore continental, i. e. the variation between summer and winter temperatures is very great. Sudden variations of temperature are frequent. The rainfall is by no means abundant, and there is a progressive decline towards the south and south-east. The fact, however, that the bulk of the rainfall occurs in the summer favours agricultural operations, even where the annual amount of rainfall is comparatively low. It is only in New Russia that the country suffers seriously from drought.

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

312 The Ukraine is very backward in regard to sanitary
364 conditions. Less than half the towns have a satisfactory water-supply, and a very small percentage of them a regular drainage system.

164 Typhoid, diphtheria, and malaria are very prevalent.
158 To the great majority of the people in the country, doctors are inaccessible, and even in the towns good hospitals and adequate medical attendance are very rare. In the matter of cleanliness, however, the Little
515 Russians compare favourably with the Great Russians.

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

Race

162 The population of the Ukraine is composed of
● 563 a mixture of various races and nationalities, those chiefly represented being Little Russians, Poles, Jews,

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Germans, Moldavians, and Bulgarians. There are 162
also a certain number of Cossacks, but these are of 563
Little Russian origin. The large majority of the inhabitants of the Ukraine are Little Russians, as will be seen by the tables given below. The origin of the Little Russians and their precise relation to the other branches of the Slav family are still a matter of dispute, but it is possible that they are of purer stock than the Great Russians, though they have assimilated Polish and Tatar elements, while the Great Russians have been largely influenced by the Finns.

The *Poles* live chiefly in the western Ukraine, occupying the Governments of Volhynia and Podolia, and the Kiev and Berdichev districts in the Government of Kiev. The large estates are chiefly in their hands, and they are tenants of many others, while they also fill important positions in the sugar trade and in general carry much weight in the social and economic life of the western and central Ukraine. They are Roman Catholics.

The *Jews*, who form a most important commercial, industrial, and political group, are found in the Governments of Volhynia, Podolia, Kiev (except in the capital), Chernigov, Poltava, Kherson, Yekaterinoslav (except in Yalta), and Taurida. The town of Berdichev, in particular, is a Jewish stronghold. Many of the largest estates are mortgaged to the Jews, although they tend to live in the towns, where they succeed as good business men and middle men. Statistics for the Jewish population in the Ukraine given in the *Recueil de matériaux sur la situation économique des Israelites de Russie, d'après l'enquête de la 'Jewish Colonisation Association'*, 1908, do not show a large increase over the figures of 1897.

As regards the *Germans*, Swabian colonies have existed at Odessa since 1803, and the famous Liebental agricultural colony between the Dniester and the Black Sea was founded in 1812. Below the falls of the Dnieper and in Taurida there are Mennonite colonies from West and East Prussia. There are also German agriculturists

162 563 in Volhynia, who have done excellent work in draining the marshes. The Germans make their agriculture pay, and commercially they have penetrated to every town in the Ukraine. They also control many of the large estates and possess considerable financial influence. Their religion is Lutheran, Roman Catholic, or Mennonite. From a comparison of the table on p. 11 with figures for 1915 given by Dr. Max Friederichsen, it appears that the Germans in the Ukraine have decreased by about 50,000 since 1897. Many have emigrated to America; others have been assimilated.

There are many *Moldavians* engaged in agriculture in the districts of Tyraspol, Yelisavetgrad, Ananiev, and Kherson. They form 6 per cent. of the population in the Government of Kherson, and 0·2 per cent. in that of Yekaterinoslav. Their religion is Orthodox Greek, as is also that of the *Bulgarians.* The latter are to be found chiefly in the districts of Berdyansk, Melitopol, Tyraspol, and round Odessa, and make excellent farmers. Though they speak Bulgarian, most of them understand Russian.

The *Cossacks* are energetic farmers, and have extensive farms. In their methods they are far in advance of the ordinary Little or Great Russians.

Among other nationalities are some *Czechs* in south-west Volhynia, and a certain number of *White Russians,* chiefly in the northern part of the Government of Chernigov.

The following are the figures given by the official Russian census in 1897 for the different races in the governments composing the Ukraine:

177 or Poland, because before 1905 opposition to the Russian Government was less marked. Besides, many Russian Liberals, even of official position, treated the Ukrainian movement as an interesting variation of Russian life.

(D) SOCIAL

565 563 184 The class divisions into titled aristocracy, nobles, townsmen, merchants, and peasants, existed as in other parts of the Russian Empire, but, roughly speaking, a different ethnic element corresponded to each social division. The titled aristocracy was mainly Polish in the western parts (with the name Polish Ukrainians) and Russian in the eastern. With but few exceptions, the same could be said of the class of landed nobles, in which the Great Russians formed the majority; Poles, Germans and others were the minority. The Ukrainian landed noble was almost unknown; and the townsmen of the large towns were also in a great majority non-Ukrainian, being chiefly Great Russians and Jews (in Berdichev the Jews form 78·4 per cent. of the population; in Yekaterinoslav, 40 per cent.), and, in the western Ukraine, Russian, Polish, German, Greek, &c. The Jews were mainly traders and shopkeepers, while the Great Russians and the foreigners were manufacturers.

565 [463] But few of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia* took part in the industrial life of the country, about one-third of them belonging to the professional classes, i. e. doctors, Government officials, lawyers, and teachers. The Ukrainian professional classes originated from the ex-Cossacks and the townsmen rather than from the peasants, since there is a great distinction between the peasants and other members of the community. The Ukrainian nobles, it must be remembered, have in most cases become russified, and partly also polonized. The distinction between the peasant and other classes is not based on economic grounds, for some peasants in the Ukraine are very rich. It lies chiefly in their cultural condition, in their education, or rather lack

565 so efficiently without the help of educated foreigners
184 for some generations to come.

000 *The Ukraine and Great Russia.*—The future of the Ukraine affects Great Russia in the first instance. If the Ukraine is permanently severed from Great Russia, the latter will have to limit itself to the 'Moscow-Siberian' Empire, for it is hardly likely that any other native states formed within the limits of the former Russian Empire (Azerbaijan, Esthonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, the North Caucasian Republic, White Russia) would then belong to her. There seems to be a similarity between these states and the Ukraine, in that they all refuse to recognize Russian suzerainty, though they may possibly join Russia as states with equal rights. The Ukraine is the largest and richest of these states, so that she might play a determining part in their negotiation with Great Russia if she produces the necessary statesman. On the other hand, small as these other states are, they are more homogeneous ethnically and more advanced culturally than the Ukraine, and are able, with the exception of White Russia, to carry on political and economic affairs by themselves.

The Ukraine and Poland.—Poland and the Ukraine are neighbours who supplement each other in the economic sphere; and Poland has many men of education and enterprise. But good relations depend largely on the issue of the political conflict within the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists claim Galicia as far as the River San, while the Poles, especially the Galician Poles, claim it all for Poland. The ethnic boundary is roughly along the River Bug. In the Eastern Galician problem lies the most serious danger of quarrel.

523 The next interest of Poland is in her minorities in Volhynia, Podolia, and Kiev. They consist of noble landowners or professionals in the towns, some of them men whose families have lived there for the last four or five centuries. The reverse is the case of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The Polish minorities in the Russian Ukraine are much smaller, but in

education and social standard they have a more 563 ●
important position. The satisfaction of the claims of the Polish 'historic minority' will depend on the form of the future Government in the Ukraine, and is bound up with similar claims on the part of the Great-Russians and other nationalities.

The Ukraine and Rumania.—The Ruthenians of the 100
Bukovina and of Northern Hungary are more closely related to the Eastern Galicians than to the Russian Ukrainians. Though their number does not reach much more than a quarter of a million, the Ukrainian propagandists have, from 1914 onwards, claimed the Bukovina and also parts of Northern Hungary. Their claims conflict here with those of the Rumanians. The desire of Rumania and Poland to have a common frontier is thus opposed both by Galician Ukrainians and by Russian Ukrainian nationalists.

The Ukraine and the Jews.—Though hating the Jews, 563
the Ukrainian nationalists need them economically as people of superior financial capacity and economic education. As there is no class of Ukrainians which could rival the Jews in these respects (though other countries with large Jewish minorities, e. g. Poland and Rumania, have evolved such a class in the last fifty years), the Ukrainians have so far given in to the the Jewish demands[1] for racial autonomy.

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[1] After the Congress of the Representatives of the peoples of former Russia (September 27–30, 1917, at Kiev), the Rada issued on January 9, 1918, a 'Law concerning National Personal Autonomy', in virtue of which Great-Russians and Poles and Jews have been offered such autonomies. Skoropadski suppressed it, but the Directory revived it in December 1918.

464 [166] districts through the long winter has led to the creation of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the [563] country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, [511] Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 221 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful, but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 511 565 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any branch of industry. The State makes no effort to regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

alleviate these conditions various measures have been 425 adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguishing 511 of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers 565 of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the 421 general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated 241 on the three-field system, each unit of land being 311 planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their 425 perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that 563 held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

648 hands, will be regulated in the separate treaties with the Ukrainian People's Republic, which form an essential part of the present peace treaty, and, so far as is practicable, will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

Article IX.—The agreements made in this treaty constitute an indivisible whole.

Article X.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Ukrainian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and the Ukraine; the German, Hungarian, and Ukrainian text for the relations between Turkey and the Ukraine.

Final prescription. The present peace treaty will be ratified. The ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as nothing therein prescribes otherwise, the peace treaty comes into force on its ratification. (Here follow the signatures.)

A supplementary treaty of twenty-eight articles was signed between Germany and the Ukraine on the same day. It deals with the resumption of consular relations, the revival of 'treaties, arrangements and agreements which were in force between Germany and Russia before the war', exchange of prisoners, compensation for damage, &c. (*The New Europe*, February 28, 1918.)

III

THE GERMAN COLONISTS IN S. RUSSIA (from F. Stach, *Survey of the History of the Colonists in S. Russia and their Present Life*. Moscow, 1916.)

175
563 Realizing that in the southern territories acquired by Russia in the eighteenth century only colonists with a certain amount of culture could introduce a settled life and develop the resources of the country, Catherine the Great published a manifesto on December 4, 1762, inviting foreign colonists. As a result, 102 colonies were established on the Lower Volga in the Saratov and Samara Governments, 6 in Chernigov, 1 in Voronezh, 2 in Lifland, and 6 in the Petrograd Government. A further manifesto followed on July 22, 1763, enlarging the privileges of the colonists, which were very considerable.

This manifesto was the basis of the colonies of Russia. On March 19, 1764, a supplementary act was issued granting 30 desyatines of land to each family and prescribing the method of settling and rights of inheritance. The land was to pass to youngest son; this measure would force the father to teach elder sons various industries. Another manifesto of July 19, 1785, promised freedom from all taxation for 6 years. 115 563

The first party of settlers from Danzig, many of whom were Mennonite sectaries, arrived at Kremenchug in 1787. On September 6, 1800, Paul I proclaimed special privileges to the Mennonites of Novorossiya (Governments of Kherson, Taurida, Yekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks' Territory); 65 desyatines were granted to each family, and it was promised that they would never be called up for military and other duties against their wish. Further regulations concerning the colonists appeared in 1804.

In the reign of Alexander I, in 1818, a new Care Committee for South-Russian Colonies (Governments of Kherson, Yekaterinoslav, Taurida, and Bessarabia) was established in Yekaterinoslav 1818–22; it migrated to Kishinev a little later. On July 1, 1833, the Committee was limited in power and transferred to Odessa. It existed till July 4, 1871, when it was cancelled and all Russian colonists were placed under the general law. In 1874 they, together with the others, were made amenable to conscription.

Relations between the colonists and the Russians.—Before the Crimean War, and even down to 1860, the Russian towns had very little to do with the colonists, except in the case of those colonies which were situated in the neighbourhood of Odessa, Yekaterinoslav, Nikolaev, Simferopol, Chernigov, Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, and Petrograd. At first intercourse arose from commercial relations. But the influence of colonists on the Nogai was much greater after about 1809 and 1835 when the Nogai received land for permanent settlements. T. Kornis, a colonist of Orlovo, was responsible for helping some 17,000 Nogai to settle down. When the *dukhobors* of Tambov and Voronezh migrated to the neighbourhood of the Mennonites, they were greatly helped by them.

The Ministry of Public Property published in 1846 a report showing that at that time the colonists occupied 1,424,619 desyatines of land (1,309,945 arable). Their number was 95,342 men and 88,293 women, and they were chiefly engaged in agriculture, then cattle-breeding, butter-making, fruit cultivation, tobacco plantation, vegetable-growing, silk industry, wine plantation, and various applied industries.

In agriculture, so early as 1870, they used harvest machines, and in 1905 steam and electrical agricultural machines. In the sixties the Russian, Serbian, and Bulgarian colonists began to imitate the Germans, so that now their methods in agriculture are very much alike. During the last 50 years many colonists bought large private landed estates, especially in the Dneprovsk district; but for the last 25 years there has been a tendency to sell all land to the Russian colonists and migrate to the towns.

The Russian language was introduced in the schools of the colonists in 1860; and in 1871 their schools were taken over by the Ministry of Education.

The German colonies are chiefly found in the Governments of Taurida, Volhynia, and Yekaterinoslav.

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LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 ONE of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise
of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity
fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one
state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity
makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some
countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been
achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native
languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of
u commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers
563 those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period
191 before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity
SU by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing,
563 Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of
191 no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian
Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than
the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by
attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians,
u Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of
[186] unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put
language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government
and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

u Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and
829 that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of
191 all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language
SU uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication
829 existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language
191 could not really permeate the minorities and break down their
national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached
by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then,
once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were
opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and
adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would
appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

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122 [1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

those the minorities possessed; and the necessity for knowing Russian U
would be heightened by drawing the minorities into the industrial, 829
commercial and political life of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, 191
literacy in the minority languages would facilitate the spread of com- SU
munist doctrines stressing the international solidarity of the working- 829
class against capitalism. To achieve unity while allowing the free use 191
of minority languages might be the long — and perhaps very dangerous — way around, but Lenin believed it would be the only effective way in a backward, heterogeneous country like Russia.

The Soviet leaders were so certain that eventual lingustic uniform- U
ity could be attained only through temporary diversity that they 563
went further in emphasizing minority languages than any state has 191
ever gone: they made vigorous attempts to foster the actual use of SU
the minority languages, to "nationalize" (i.e., "Ukrainize," "Arme- 563 ●
nianize," "Tartarize") political organizations, administrative appara- 191
tus, factory managements, trade-unions, military units, newspapers, books, theatres and schools, among the minorities. In their desire to retreat from the old Imperial policy of Russification, they leaned over so far backward that they introduced the element of compulsion in the opposite direction: they forced the national minorities and the Russians living among them to use the local languages in political, economic and cultural life, stopping short only at the threshold of the individual's private world. The ultimate effect of this policy upon the increase or decrease of nationalism among the minorities is not yet apparent, and the fate of such nationalism may hinge upon such factors as economic prosperity, political liberty and developments in the field of international relations; but the process of nationalizing the political, economic and cultural life of the minorities is an experiment which deserves more attention from the non-Soviet political and
scholarly world than it has received. U

In the field of education, the Soviet régime has followed a four-fold 871 191
policy: first to establish a school system embracing all children; sec- 869
ondly, to promote the spread of communist doctrines by integrating 563
them into the curriculum; thirdly, to nationalize the school system SU
by introducing the languages of the minorities as the languages of in- 871 191
struction in schools attended by children of the minorities; and, 869
fourthly, to pave the way for eventual assimilation by providing for 563
the study of Russian as a separate subject in the schools of the
minorities. The first two aspects of this policy are complex subjects, U
each of which deserves a separate study. The present discussion will 121
therefore treat only of the linguistic phases of the Soviet educational policy: the nationalization of education — that is, the use of minority

At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly 874
Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine 171
was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was 656
frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of 871
Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention 563 ●
chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where 652
such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

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[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.

[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930.

[43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.

[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931.

[45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.

[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931.

[47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

871 icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children ● 513 remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the na- 656 tional minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

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[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130.

[49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii* (*Bil'šovikiv*) *Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in 871
the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using 563
that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were 656
using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities;
and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number [191]
of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

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[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.

[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.

[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.

[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.

[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.

[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

871 563 656 children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian [191] schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

874 563 191 That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

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[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51.

in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrain- 874
ian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 563
1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 per- 191
cent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller 871
nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional im- 191
petus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the 656
Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

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[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.

[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926.

[64] *Ibid.*

871 in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no addi-191 tional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

656 In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efre-[474] mov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and [687] cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had [563] condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in ***Proletarska Pravda*** stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

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[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian- 871
Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first 191
four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66] 156

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those
of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in [563]●
1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of 871
education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and 162
a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 212
1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

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[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the 871
Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to 191
this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 656
hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important
change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general
school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle
schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language
study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools.
The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian
middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the
Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities,
illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian
assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle
schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position
far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages.
The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter [563] ●
Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, [369]
except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social
intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally
well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the
Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar
with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the
village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city
children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do
the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly
important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat
of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of
French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the
fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages
from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction [885]
of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults
to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results,
and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go
on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering 517
of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the 185
government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. 191
Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and
music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and
without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

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[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.

[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv* . . . , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

[volhynia]

361 tossed down on the land, without any relationship to it. "The absence of public buildings alone had [342] a depressive effect. These wooden huts on a slope, supported by stakes as though by high stilts, seemed merely to have been set down as chance would have it, less secure and permanent than nomad tents which the next day perhaps might already be taken down again. It scarcely seemed worthwhile to lay out a few roadways provisionally. For the rest, there was not a trace of a city plan, of a systematizing, architectural hand. Everything seemed temporary and unfinished, simply amassed, never shaped. The expression "shanty town" applied in a special /18/ sense to these places. Our criteria of beautifully compact city plans do not apply. Never concentrated within the area most difficult to attack, never held together by walls and moats, these Russian clusters of houses and courtyards which can scarcely be called cities any more, gradually become lost in the distance, without shape or outline: mirror images of the landscape that bears them, of the language that echoes in them, of the way of thinking of the people they house." (9)

9. Tintrup: *War in the Ukraine*, pages 23 and 24.

101 If you would now turn east in the direction of Kiyev, you would come through numerous rambling 361 villages with streets. They contain attractive ●563 farms where until recently you would have been warmly welcomed with German sounds. The Volhynia Germans lived here. But you continue northward 101 until the Volhynia plateau with a gradual incline 133 sinks into the Polesian swamps. You avoid this marsh land by turning northeast, and thus come to the extreme northwest tip of the Ukrainian area of settlement, Podlakhia, whose waters flow toward the Baltic. The primeval forests of Bila Vesha are gloomy, but even more gruesome are the deep

11: Obermaier--93 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

/91/ [Galicia] Self-Aid [Volhynia]

555 Galicia and Volhynia are parts of the ghetto of the world, lying between Cracow and Odessa. There is no question about the fact that anyone who can here compete commercially with the Jews and politically with the Poles has certain abilities. The Ukrainians of Galicia have a talent for organization. If their business methods are often primitive according to our conceptions, it
555 is not their fault. Where proper money is scarce,
[436] as is the case among all small peasants of the
476 East and Southeast, it is replaced by some marketable goods: people unhesitatingly deal in eggs. Ukrainian cooperatives tried very hard to change these conditions; they were equally adept in ancient barter as in international business involving clearing and regulations pertaining to payments and foreign exchange.

Jews and cooperatives waged a bitter fight against each other. But where usury and chain businesses of ill repute flourish, cooperatives
[452] have an easy time of it. Before the First World War the usurers demanded a 100% interest. Now they say: "I am giving you money; good, - but you must sell me your calves, your geese, your chickens and your eggs." For a zentner of seed they demand two zentner of produce from the harvest. In the gin shops they manage to obtain, by fraudulent means, the best pastures of the Huzul country, only to rent them to the former owners. If the cooperative makes its way into such villages which are under Jewish domination, it soon has the peasants on its side, and since no one buys from the Jew, no one sells to him and his inn is avoided, he must sooner or later pack up his belongings. /92/

563 For the Ukrainians the Jewish problem is a problem of food. Wherever people have ambitions and where they desire to improve their basic way of living, they run up against Jews. Jews

[Galicia] [Volhynia] European Jews E14

U 563 E.J. 162 are found in the villages and cities, everywhere except at hard peasant labor. As early as 1900, 74% of all Jews earning a livelihood in Russia, Poland and Galicia were in commerce, in the credit system, in crafts and in industry. In 1931 there [U 463] were 158,400 Jews living in villages in East Galicia alone, that is 3% of the people living in the country; in the cities, on the other hand, there were 454,900 Jews or 37.3% of the urban population. (51) In 1929 the various trades were 50% in the hands of Jews, and in Volhynia a total of 73% of all tailors, shoemakers, tanners, bakers, furriers, blacksmiths, watchmakers and other artisans were Jews.

U 563 In spite of the fact that the Ukrainians lived in such close proximity to Jews, they kept their cultural life free of Jewish influence and their race free from Jewish blood.

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U 476 "More important than selling and profit is the community which has become happy and morally strong as a result of proper training by means of cooperative work and self-aid." These words were not, as might be supposed, spoken at a major assembly of German cooperatives; they were coined at Lwów by the head of the Ukrainian cooperatives. They were addressed to the West Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian cooperatives were of unusual national significance; they improved the wretched condition of the peasants and educated the latter to think in terms of the common welfare; and they offered to Ukrainian intelligentsia a real, albeit meager possibility of existence. U 162 How can conditions in the country be anything but miserable if 60% of the peasants own dwarf farms with less than

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51. Seraphim, Jewry in East European Area, p. 340.

871 of the universities which were for a long time forbidden, the "technical institutes" and the more advanced type of these, the "institutes for popular education". In recent times universities have again been revived.

In this connection it may be said that the obligation to attend elementary school begins at the age of eight and ends at the age of twelve. Two-thirds of the elementary pupils leave school before their four years are up. The subjects of instruction of the first few grades of the workers' school include, among other things: 1. Lenin - revolutionary, Communist, protector of workers and peasants; his death, short biography. 2. The Czar and the workers in the year 1905. 3. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. (68) - The "professional schools" are regular schools for fifteen- and eighteen-year-olds, corresponding somewhat to our German agricultural and business schools. The "workers' schools", on the other hand, are attended only at certain hours by factory apprentices. /124/ The "workers' academies" are somewhat like the former German people's universities. The course of study lasts four years; it entitles the graduate to register in universities without having to take any kind of entrance examinations. The Party schools train agitators and propagandists; the technical schools and institutes train engineers, chemists and specialists in various fields in a three-year, and in some cases a four- and five-year course of study. [563] While the process of Ukrainization was going on in 1928, there were among all university students in the Ukraine 15.8% Russians, 23% Jews, 56% Ukrainians and the rest students of other nationalities. (69) In 1933 and 1934 universities

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68. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 40.

69. Siropolko: The General Education in the Soviet Union, page 98.

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the warehousing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932 425 the Council of the People's Commissars came to the following decision: "The resistance of those communists who in reality have become leaders of the sabotage, as well as the passive and favorably disposed attitude of various Party organizations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated." (91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

563 which at that time belonged entirely to Russia. (92) These 900,000 German colonists cultivated 4.9 million desiatiny*/desiatina, pl. desiatiny: Russian measure of land = 2.70 acres. Editor/ of land or an area as large as Alsace Lorraine, Baden and Württemberg combined. They had been given 700,000 desiatiny as colonization land, and bought an additional 4.2 million desiatiny since then.

These Germans achieved important things in agriculture. They introduced the iron plough and agricultural machinery into the Ukraine. Their attempt to plant forests in the steppes in order to check the eternal wind of the steppes and the severe dust storms did not bring the success desired. But they magically produced vineyards and orchards on soil that no one cared to cultivate. In the North Caucasus, on the other hand, they tried in vain to cultivate grapes and silkworms, before establishing tree nurseries which were to become famous throughout the realm of the czars. In 20 years they sold 20 million of the finer sorts of fruit trees from these nurseries and an equal number of berry bushes and /149/ ornamental trees. Besides that they developed the breeding of Ardennes horses and valuable beef cattle. (93) But this does not exhaust the achievements of the German colonists. They invented a special way of weaving light cotton fabrics which are very well adapted to the climate.

92. Stumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, in Deutschtum im Ausland, Number 5, 1939, page 251.

93. Strumpp: Achievements and Importance of the German Colonists in Russia, page 256.

11: Obermaier--158 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

563 German wheelwrights (Ukrainian: "stel'makh"), carpenters, smiths and locksmiths (Ukrainian:"sl'usar'") were very much in demand. Before the First World War there were 100 German shops in Odessa, among them two bookstores. Factories for agricultural machines arose from small beginnings, and they sent their products as far as Siberia. From 80 to 90% of all Bolshevik factories for agricultural machinery were founded by Germans.

The Germans were not spared their toll of blood in the Ukraine. At the beginning of the First World War they had to suffer in the persecutions of the Czarist regime. Then they fought with Denikin and Wrangel against the Bolsheviks and were defeated. Finally the "death taxes" began, which were followed by a new civil war and the famine. No one knows how many of our compatriots lost their lives in these catastrophes. Many emigrated to Canada and the United States as long as they were still able to do so.

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474 Thus after the Ukraine was prostrate, Moscow could without danger loosen the noose. This was also dictated by the instinct for self-preservation, for bread and meat were urgently needed for the growing industrial areas. The process of making collectives out of small private properties was abandoned. When at the Seventeenth Party Congress in January and February 1934 an urgent recommendation was issued for people to lead a "joyous and happy life", those who had been murdered or who had died of hunger no longer heard it, and for the ones who were exiled it sounded like bitter sarcasm. At the same time concessions were granted in the household and horticultural economy of the members of the collectives. The new collective economy statute of 1935 permits the individual farmer to own /150/ 1 hectare of land, 1 cow and 2 heifers, 5 pigs, 10 sheep or

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

10. Iron & steel

12. Sugar

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal
9. Ores

11. Grain

13. Wood

15. Various finished products

000 /Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/*/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large
369 areas/*/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in
162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

● 563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian guberniyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

1[For stats, cf. pp. 224-225, category 11c - Analyst]

563 of Jews who had been crowded together in the Ukraine began into the interior of Russia. The process of urbanization of the Jewish population was in full swing even before the First World War. Already by the year 1897 77.4% of the 1.2 million [162] Jews in Russian Ukraine lived in cities, where they made up 22.7% of the population. (113)

113. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 322.

Meanwhile the urbanization continued. The proportion of Jews in the total urban population of the district of Kiyev came to 28% in 1926, in the Odessa district it was 31%, in Dniepropetrovsk 32%, in Podolia 54.7%, in the highly industrial Donets region only 9.1%. (114)

114. Seraphim: The Jewry in East European Area, page 333.

000 Even though the Jews controlled almost the entire wholesale and retail trade in the Ukraine before the First World War, and were extremely influential in banking, this was not true of the apparatus of government. Gone today are the traders who realized fat profits on the 4000 Ukrainian fairs, who bought from wholesale dealers and wandered through the country as barterers; private trade has been shattered and the banks are state-controlled, but the influence of the Jews is greater than ever. As early as 1926 they had established themselves in government positions far beyond those that were open to them, and ruled over the Ukrainian and Russian people. In the municipal Soviets they had 20.1% of all positions, in the trade unions 38.1%; in /170/ the judiciary they had 18.9%, in finance administration 19.4%, in the cooperatives 26.8%, in the credit system 35.1% and in public affairs even 44.2% of all

11: Obermaier--205 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

181 The innermost feelings of the Ukrainians in the days of their liberation is described by a German war correspondent a few weeks after the Bolsheviks were driven out of Kiyev, in the following words of a Ukrainian physician in Kiyev: "You Germans must be very patient with us! You must help us as though we were schoolchildren to whom one must teach the most elementary aspects of life step by step! You must give us strength once more to believe in humanity! For we are not ourselves. We are pitiful, down-trodden, homeless creatures, human beings deprived of all that was sacred, who night and day have lived in the fear of being deported, exiled or shot because of our very existence." (135)

> 135. "Kiew - der Blutegel der Ukraine," Kiyev, the leech of the Ukraine, by the war correspondent, Erwin Kirchhof.

070 What, therefore, is to become of this country where intelligent men voice such shattering words? Now that the Bolsheviks have been driven out, there will first of all have to be a thorough stock-taking of the Ukrainian people to determine the presence of living cells capable of growth and development, in order that we may then, with careful consideration, be able to build, stone by stone, a new and better future. Too much in the way of diversified wealth and talent in the Ukraine has been destroyed or stunted by Muscovite imperialists, beginning with Peter the Great down to Stalin, the strangler, to make possible the achievement of such a tremendous task of reconstruction within a few years.

/Map in pocket of book/

The Peoples of the Ukraine

183
162 The distribution in 1939 of peoples and ethnic

11: Obermaier--206 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

563 groups living in Ukrainian territory. For each
162 race there are two, sometimes even three degrees of density shown: a highly concentrated area of 90 percent (however without regard to Jews who in some areas constitute 10 percent and more of the population), then a majority area of 90 percent, and finally an area where no group has the absolute majority and where the relative majority is shown. The Ukraine is most compactly settled in the center as well as toward the west, north and south, whereas in the east it is loosely settled. Here a motley aspect of ethnic intermingling appeared; peoples live next to each other who racially, culturally and in matters of religion belong to the most diverse ethnic groups: Ukrainians and Great Russians, Central European Germans, Turko-Tatars, Mongolian peoples, as well as those small, heterogeneous mountain tribes of the Caucasus, that represent remnants of peoples in areas of regression.

11: Obermaier J-3(no date) 1942
RD1 Ukraine RD1

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P.-211	P.212	P.213	P.214
P..207	P.208	P.209	P.210

Schematic diagram to
end map

p.206(a)

11:Obermaier--207 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

•563
162

/Key/

1. ▩ Ukrainians over 90 percent
▧ 50-90 percent
░ relative majority

2. ▥ Russians over 90 percent
▥ 50-90 percent
▥ relative majority

8 ▧ Greeks 50-90 percent
▧ relative majority

9 ▨ Hungarians 50-90 percent
▨ relative majority

11:Obermaier--208 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

▥ Rumanians over 90 percent
▦ 50-90 percent
▥ relative majority

▩ Germans over 90 percent
▩ 50-90 percent

▨ Tatars 50-90 percent
▨ relative majority

▒ Kalmuchs over 90 percent
▒ 50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--209 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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

Slovaks
over 90 percent ▨
50-90 percent ▨

Ruthenians
over 90 percent ░
50-90 percent ░

Caucasian Mtn. tribes
over 90 percent ░
50-90 percent ▥

Bulgarians
50-90 percent ▨

Armenians
50-90 percent ▦

11:Obermaier--210 J-3 (no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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162


Ordschonikidse
Poles
over 90 percent
50-90 percent
Nogai
50-90 percent
Kirgiz or Kazakh
50-90 percent

11:Obermaier--211 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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
Brest Litowsk
Lemberg
Czernowitz

11:Obermaier--212 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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162


Homel
Kijew
Dnjepropetrowsk
Kischinew
Odessa

11:Obermaier--213 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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162



Woronesch
Woroschilowgrad
Rostow
sk

11:Obermaier--214 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 563
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
Saratow
Stalingrad
Astrachan

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

631 Art. 79. On the expiration of the terms of office of the regional, area, district, city settlement or village Soviets of Working People's Deputies, their executive and administrative organs retain their powers until the newly elected Soviets shall have formed new executive and administrative organs.

Chapter VI. The Budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

652 Art. 80. The state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is drawn up by the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for its approval.

646 [645] Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is published for general information.

Art. 81. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 82. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR and published for general information.

631 652 Art. 83. The budgets of the regional, area, district, city, settlement and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territory and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

Chapter VII. The Courts and the Procurator's Office

692 Art. 84. In the Ukrainian SSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, the Regional and Area Courts, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the People's Courts.

[693] Art. 85. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

Art. 86. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is the highest judicial organ of the Ukrainian SSR. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR.

[646] Art. 87. The Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR for a term of five years.

Art. 88. Regional and area courts are elected by regional and area Soviets of Working People's Deputies for a term of five years.

Art. 89. People's courts are elected by the citisens of the district on basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

695 [563] Art. 90. Judicial proceedings in the Ukrainian SSR are conducted in the Ukrainian language, persons not knowing the language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

641 Art. 102. Women in the Ukrainian SSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life.

[562] The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education and by State protection of the interests of mother and child, State aid to mothers of large families and unmarried mothers, maternity leave with full pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

[563] Art. 103. Equality of rights of citizens of the Ukrainian SSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, State, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality and also any propagation of racial or national exclusiveness, hatred and contempt - are punishable by law.

[659] Art. 104. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the Ukrainian SSR is separated from the State and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

Art. 105. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed by law:

(a) Freedom of speech;
(b) Freedom of the press;
(c) Freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
(d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

[575] Art. 106. In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are ensured the right to unite in public organizations — trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and State.

[694] Art. 107. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

Art. 108. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

Art. 109. The Ukrainian SSR affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

24: Cech and Mellon S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-
Ruthenians

292 531 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of tradional costumes. The beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

609 574 Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia. Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

177 471 563 464 241 In the southern part of the country life and people are different. Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hungarians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

369 655 438 Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns, such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

361 341 The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

24: Cech and Mellor S-2 (no date) 1944 Ukrainians-Ruthenians

361 is a wide boulevard bordered with beautiful flowers. Across the river,
341 to the left from a bridge, is a colourful little church in Russian style—
a miniature replica of a Moscow *cerkev*—a piece of the Orient in a
western setting. It is a delightful building coloured in dull red and
white, and has a burnished cupola at the top which reflects the sun in
a dazzling blaze. The interesting ikons in the interior match the fairy-tale
beauty of its exterior. What a lively contrast to the dignified,
twin-spired Greek Catholic cathedral and the surrounding ecclesiastical
buildings on the opposite side of the river.

162 There are at least four religions in Užhorod, as well as in other
Ruthenian towns, and five languages are spoken there—Ruthenian,
563 Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Yiddish.

While Ruthenia has no mineral wealth comparable to that of
135 Slovakia, it supplies the entire Republic with salt. In the eastern tip
317 of the country, right on the Rumanian frontier, there are huge deposits
of mineral salt in the neighbourhood of Slatinské Doly. Although only
two mines are now being worked, the annual output amounts to about
120,000 tons of salt. The huge vaulted caves of these mines afford an
imposing view from a gallery which rises at a considerable height above
the bottom where the miners quarry large blocks of rock-salt, cut them
into small blocks, and have them hoisted through the shaft to the surface.
The mineral salt which is crushed in a salt-mill is only slightly impure
and requires little cleaning.

317 Salt represents the mineral wealth of Carpathian Ruthenia. But it
is a commodity which the poor Ruthenian peasants and wood-cutters
263 cannot afford. In order to spice their simple and meagre food the
countryfolk journey a day or two to a pool of salt-water to fill a barrel
with the liquid salt.

178 To appreciate the degree of progress Carpathian Ruthenia made
during the twenty years of its association with Czechoslovakia, one has
511 to bear in mind the condition of this forgotten country when it first
185 appeared on the map as a political unit. The dire poverty, the low
standard of education among the majority of the population, lack of
cultural amenities, infectious diseases due to abominable sanitary conditions,
inadequate communications, economic and political exploitation
—all these factors made the life of the Ruthenians under the Carpathian
mountains rather desolate.

President Masaryk once said that thirty years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development would be needed to make the Czechoslovak State secure and happy. Carpathian Ruthenia certainly needed thirty, if not more, years of peaceful, reasonable and energetic development to emerge from her condition of poverty and primitiveness.

744 One of the worst evils was the appalling sanitary conditions in
164 Ruthenia. The rate of infant mortality was among the highest in

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

UKRAINE RD1

Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs 101
to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in [186]
paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's. [538]

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. [167] Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit 167 for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

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* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their 563 Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

UKRaine RD1

that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Rus- 661
sian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and
that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision 186
constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine 665
and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance, whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563] against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the recapture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians, particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organiza- 661
tion of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nation- 665
alist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable 668
in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. UK. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- UK. 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

UKRAINE R01

[Greeks]

[Bulgarians]

UK. 563
S.U. 563

useful function from the point of view of the central state authorities.

The smaller minorities such as Bulgars, Greeks and Germans were of little political importance but their survival constituted an interesting reminder that the Ukraine and particularly its southern parts owed a great deal to foreign colonists.

For the non-Ukrainian population of the Ukraine twenty-seven national districts had been called into being, including eight Russian, nine German, one Polish and three each for Bulgars, Greeks and Jews. Besides, there were twelve Czech and three Albanian National Village Soviets.

The events of the war left the Russian minority in the Ukraine more or less untouched but led to the annihilation or considerable reduction in size of most of the other minority groups such as the Germans, Greeks, Jews and Bulgars and only a few remnants of the previous elaborate system of National Districts and National Village Soviets persisted.

1. GREEKS. Most Greeks of the Ukraine had been subject to an enforced exodus similar to that of the German colonists. They had played a remarkable role in colonizing the south-eastern corner of the Ukraine, the area north of the Azov Sea. They had not only established a large number of villages but had also founded the town of Mariupol in 1775. Right up to the beginning of the twentieth century Mariupol still had a considerable number of Greek inhabitants.

Under the Bolshevik régime, Mariupol, one of the big centres of Soviet heavy industry, lost not only its Greek inhabitants but also its Greek name, and in 1948 assumed that of a Russian communist, A. A. Zhdanov, a native of the city.

The All-Union Communist Party tried to educate the 'Soviet Greeks' into reliable Soviet citizens. Although more than half of the 285,000 'Soviet Greeks' lived in the Ukraine, it was considered preferable to concentrate the work of cultural and political enlightenment in the Greek language not on Ukrainian territory but in the city of Rostov-on-Don, within easy reach of both the Greek settlements of the Ukraine and the Greek minority groups scattered in the Northern Caucasus region. Rostov became the headquarters of a Greek communist publishing house from which the Greek language newspaper *Kommunistis* and Greek communist pamphlets were dispatched both to the 'Azov Sea Greeks' and to the Northern Caucasus Greeks.

However, this propaganda seems to have been of little avail since the 'Soviet Greeks' appeared to have been 'unreliable' at the time of the German military advance. Many of them were deported by the Soviet authorities, most probably to Soviet Asia.

2. BULGARIANS. The 'Soviet Greeks' had never been of much use for propaganda intended for Greece proper; their National Districts were created for reasons of administrative convenience only. The Bulgarian

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

UKRAINE RD1

[Bulgarians]

[Albanians]

[Poles]

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S.U. 563

National Districts were a different matter. The most important of these Bulgarian National Districts received the name of Vasil Kolarov, a Bulgarian communist leader, who, after the abortive Bulgarian communist *coup d'état* of 1923, lived as an exile in the Soviet Union. The creation of the 'Kolarov District' in the Dniepropetrovsk Province with the 'capital' Kolarovka was thus a deliberate gesture to stimulate the illegal Communist Party in Bulgaria and to show its supporters that a little Soviet Bulgaria was alive inside the U.S.S.R. even if Bulgarian reaction frustrated the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the real Bulgaria for the time being.

During the German occupation of the Ukraine many Russian Bulgars – they numbered 114,000 in 1939 – were repatriated to Bulgaria. After the end of the war at least a part of these evacuees were brought back to the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence of a survival of the Bulgarian National Districts.

3. ALBANIANS. There has been definite news that the 3,000 Albanians of the Soviet Ukraine have survived the war and have maintained their three Village Soviets in the Azov District of the Melitopol Province. The best evidence that this small minority remained in favour with the authorities was the fact that a fairly comprehensive study of their customs was published after the Second World War.[25] Also at least some of the Czech Village Soviets and collective farms of the Ukraine seem to have remained and their example was used as propaganda for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia proper.

THE 'POLISH POLICY' OF THE UKRAINE

S.U. 162

The most important nationality problem for the pre-war Ukraine was the Polish problem, just as the Ukrainian problem was the most serious nationality problem of pre-war Poland.

UK 162

However unfavourable the drawing of the Soviet-Polish frontiers of 1921 had been from the Ukrainian point of view, 782,334 Poles lived, according to the 1926 census, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., of whom 476,435 were in the Ukraine itself, 97,948 in Byelorussia, and 197,827 dispersed over the R.S.F.S.R. Polish statisticians, and apparently also some Polish communists in Russia, have never accepted this figure, and have asserted that the total number of Poles amounted to 1,500,000.[26]

S.U. 563

During the inter-war period Soviet policy considered the 'Soviet Poles' primarily as a potential revolutionary vanguard. The official Soviet view was that however small the Polish minority in the Ukraine, it was its duty to develop a proletarian Polish culture within the U.S.S.R. which could influence the Poles on the other side of the border. This idea was rejected by some prominent Polish communists who thought that the